Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications
2009

Rethinking Anticircumvention's Interoperability Policy
Aaron K. Perzanowski
Case Western University School of Law, akp73@case.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Repository Citation
Perzanowski, Aaron K., "Rethinking Anticircumvention's Interoperability Policy" (2009). Faculty
Publications. 44.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/44

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Rethinking Anticircumvention’s
Interoperability Policy
Aaron K. Perzanowski*
Interoperability is widely touted for its ability to spur incremental
innovation, increase competition and consumer choice, and decrease
barriers to accessibility. In light of these attributes, intellectual property
law generally permits follow-on innovators to create products that
interoperate with existing systems, even without permission. The
anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”) represent a troubling departure from this policy, resulting in
patent-like rights to exclude technologies that interoperate with protected
platforms. Although the DMCA contains internal safeguards to preserve
interoperability, judicial misinterpretation and narrow statutory text
render those safeguards largely ineffective.
One approach to counteracting the DMCA’s restrictions on
interoperability is to rely on antitrust scrutiny and the resulting mandatory
disclosure of technical information. However, both doctrinal and policy
considerations suggest that antitrust offers a less than ideal means of
lessening the DMCA’s impact on interoperability. Rather than relying on
antitrust, this Article proposes a solution that addresses the restriction of
interoperability at its source. This approach broadens the DMCA’s existing
interoperability exemption to create an environment more hospitable to
interoperable technologies. To preserve the protections the DMCA offers
copyright holders, this expanded exemption would disaggregate control
over interoperable software and devices from the control over access and
copying that Congress intended the DMCA to enable.

*
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INTRODUCTION
In our networked environment, interoperability — the ability of two
systems to exchange and use information — is of mounting
importance. The ability of information, products, and services from a
variety of providers to work together is often key to commercial
success, in part because consumers increasingly expect it.1 More
fundamentally, interoperability has implications for competition,
innovation, and the public accessibility of creative works. To varying
degrees, companies like Facebook, Flickr, and Google have embraced
the potential of interoperability by opening their platforms to
independent developers.2 Other firms, perhaps most famously Apple,
remain committed to the virtues of tightly controlled user experiences
and thus limit interoperability.3
The degree and character of interoperability in a given market
depend in part on law. The legal regulation of interoperability varies
not only in the extent to which it favors interoperable technologies,
but also in the degree to which it intervenes in private market-driven
decisions. At the extremes, legal rules either forbid or require
interoperability.
Conversely, the law might reflect a
noninterventionist sentiment, leaving the decision to interoperate in
the hands of developers and consumers. Between these poles, legal
rules can encourage or discourage interoperability to varying degrees
and through a variety of means. The choice between these legal rules
helps determine the circumstances under which developers achieve
interoperability. Law might favor bilateral agreements between firms
to interoperate, while frowning on unilateral efforts to interoperate
with an unwilling partner, or vice versa.
This Article analyzes the impact of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) on unauthorized unilateral attempts to

1
See Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, Should Copyright Owners Have to Give
Notice of Their Use of Technical Protection Measures?, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
41, 43-46 (2007) (discussing importance of flexible personal use to consumers).
2
See Damon Darlin, A Journey to a Thousand Maps Begins with an Open Code, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at C9 (discussing availability of application programming
interfaces for Google Maps and Flickr); Posting of Brad Stone to Bits,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/02/to-counter-google-facebook-sets-code-free/
(June 2, 2008, 4:33 EST) (discussing Facebook Platform and Google’s Open Social).
3
Apple has recently warmed to some measure of interoperability by opening its
iPhone to third-party developers in response to consumer and developer demand. See
Melissa J. Perenson, Apple’s iPhone SDK Strategy Both Promotes and Stifles Innovation,
PC WORLD, Mar. 6, 2008, http://www.pcworld.com/article/143210.

1552

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 42:1549

achieve interoperability.
It argues that the anticircumvention
provisions of the DMCA unnecessarily inhibit interoperability, and it
calls for a legislative solution to reconcile the legitimate interests of
copyright holders with the need for increased freedom to interoperate.
Part I of this Article defines interoperability and examines its
implications for innovation and competition as well as its traditional
treatment under intellectual property (“IP”) law.
Admittedly,
interoperability does not always yield positive outcomes. Nonetheless,
because interoperability tends to increase innovation, competition,
and accessibility, promoting, or at least permitting, interoperability
reflects sound policy. Moreover, such an approach is consistent with
the general treatment of interoperability in IP law.
The
interoperability policy that emerges from trade secrecy, copyright, and
patent law typically permits, and occasionally promotes,
interoperability.
Part II discusses the DMCA’s departure from this interoperability
policy. The DMCA prohibits the acts of reverse engineering4 that are
often necessary to develop interoperable products, and bans the
distribution of technologies that interact with works protected by
technological measures, marking a substantial break from the earlier
treatment of interoperability. Congress recognized the DMCA’s
potential impact on interoperability and enacted a statutory exemption
— § 1201(f) — to limit its negative effects.5 Courts, however, have
consistently misinterpreted this exemption’s basic statutory
requirements. Moreover, the exemption’s narrow focus on computer
programs fails to account for technologies that rely on access to other
types of copyrighted works to achieve interoperability.
Because the DMCA’s internal safeguards fail to protect
interoperability adequately, competitors, consumers, and regulators
have increasingly turned to other legal doctrines to vindicate
unauthorized interoperability. Part III describes the efforts of litigants
and regulators in the United States and Europe to rely on antitrust and
competition principles to limit the impact of anticircumvention. This
Part expresses skepticism about the role of antitrust in restraining the
protections offered by the DMCA. Standard antitrust theories appear
unlikely to trigger liability consistently, even when tested against the
most controversial efforts to limit interoperability through
technological controls. The tight integration of Apple’s iPod portable
4
Reverse engineering is the process of “starting with the known product and
working backward to find the method by which it was developed.” UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 2 (amended 1985).
5
17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2006).
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player and iTunes store serves as one recent example of such an effort.
More fundamentally, an antitrust analysis typically demonstrates
considerable deference to the exercise of legitimately acquired IP
rights. Sensitive only to behavior that meets its threshold for
anticompetitiveness, antitrust cannot independently account for the
unique considerations of incentives for creativity, access, and
dissemination that define IP policy. Thus, the first response to any
unwanted effects of the DMCA should focus on internal limitations on
the scope of the power it affords rather than external constraints
imposed by a separate body of law.
Part IV outlines an alternative approach to the DMCA’s current
treatment of interoperability. A broadened § 1201(f) would narrow
the DMCA’s scope, thereby limiting its ability to accommodate
technologies that interoperate with all classes of copyrighted works,
not just computer programs. The chief difficulty in expanding the
DMCA’s tolerance of interoperability is ensuring that a more inclusive
§ 1201(f) does not interfere with the ability of copyright holders to
impose meaningful limits on access to and copying of their works.
This Part suggests disaggregating such restrictions from control over
playback technologies, striking an appropriate balance between
empowering copyright holders and promoting interoperability.
I.

INTEROPERABILITY

This Part addresses three preliminary questions about
interoperability. First, what is it? Second, why is it valuable? And
third, to what extent does traditional IP doctrine regulate it?
In short, interoperability is a relationship between two or more
systems by which they exchange usable information. Interoperability
is valuable because it tends to promote innovation, competition, and
access, each of which gives rise to more concrete benefits for
consumers and society generally. Partly in recognition of these
benefits, IP doctrine has largely avoided any direct regulation of
unauthorized efforts to interoperate, instead leaving market forces to
determine whether developers pursue such efforts. Some IP rules,
most notably copyright’s favorable treatment of reverse engineering,
represent explicit efforts to promote interoperability. To the extent IP
doctrine directly interferes with efforts to interoperate, it does so only
under limited circumstances.
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A. Defining Interoperability
Interoperability is the ability of a system to work in conjunction or
otherwise interact with another system.6 With respect to information
and communication technologies, interoperability takes on a more
specific meaning — the ability of two systems to exchange information
and to make use of the information exchanged.7 Although both
technical and legal definitions of interoperability vary in their precise
formulations, they share at least two common attributes.
First, interoperability is a relational concept. The term does not
refer to any inherent feature of a system, but describes a relationship
between or among two or more systems. As a result, interoperability
cannot be gauged in isolation. Instead, to determine whether a system
exhibits interoperability, that system must be considered in light of
others with which it interacts. Consequently, a system exhibiting
interoperability in one context may be noninteroperable in others.
Second, interoperability is not typically binary, but rather a matter
of degree.8 The extent to which two systems interoperate is a function
6
MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
interoperability (last visited April 29, 2009) (defining interoperability as “ability of a
system . . . to work with or use the parts or equipment of another system”).
7
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (defining interoperability as “the ability of computer
programs to exchange information, and of such programs mutually to use the
information which has been exchanged”); 44 U.S.C. § 3601(6) (Supp. III 2005)
(defining interoperability as “the ability of different operating and software systems,
applications, and services to communicate and exchange data in an accurate, effective,
and consistent manner”); Council Directive 91/250/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42 (EC)
(defining interoperability as “the ability to exchange information and mutually to use the
information which has been exchanged”); INST. OF ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, IEEE STANDARD
COMPUTER DICTIONARY: A COMPILATION OF IEEE STANDARD COMPUTER GLOSSARIES 114
(1990) [hereinafter IEEE] (defining interoperability as “[t]he ability of two or more
systems or components to exchange information and to use the information that has
been exchanged”); INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
VOCABULARY: FUNDAMENTAL TERMS (1993) (stating that interoperability is “[t]he capacity
to communicate, execute programs, or transfer data among various functional units in a
manner that requires the user to have little or no knowledge of the unique characteristics
of those units”); URS GASSER & JOHN PALFREY, BREAKING DOWN DIGITAL BARRIERS: WHEN
AND HOW ICT INTEROPERABILITY DRIVES INNOVATION 4 (2007), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/interop-breaking-barriers_
1.pdf (describing interoperability as “the ability to transfer and render useful data and
other information across systems (which may include organizations), applications, or
components”); European Interoperability Framework for Pan-European eGovernment
Services
Version
1.0,
http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/document/3761
(defining
interoperability as “the ability of information and communication technology (ICT)
systems and of the business processes they support to exchange data and to enable the
sharing of information and knowledge”).
8
See JONATHAN BAND & MASANOBU KATOH, INTERFACES ON TRIAL 8 (1995).
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of how much information they share and the degree to which they can
utilize that information. Complete seamlessness in the exchange and
use of information between systems is difficult to achieve, but
interoperability does not demand perfection.9
Because it is both relational and gradated, interoperability is a
flexible, context-sensitive descriptor of a variety of interactions.
However, these characteristics also introduce considerable imprecision.
Even after a relationship is classified as interoperable, some important
questions remain unanswered, among them the degree of reciprocity
between two interoperable systems. Interoperability does not require
that the stream of useful information between two systems flow in both
directions. Interoperability, therefore, can embrace both bidirectional
and unidirectional information exchanges. Further, interoperability
can arise from cooperation between two or more systems or from a
unilateral decision by the designers of a single system to interoperate
with another.
Indeed, either system in a potential exchange of information can
take steps to facilitate or frustrate interoperability. As a result, either
system in an interoperable relationship can do the heavy lifting in the
exchange of information.10 A system encourages interoperability by
using open, unencrypted, or easily reverse-engineered file formats,
data structures, and communications protocols. These design choices
yield outputs that other systems can use without a great deal of effort
or expense.
Conversely, systems that encrypt data, employ proprietary data
structures or communications protocols, or erect barriers to reverse
When systems share
engineering, discourage interoperability.11
information in ways that impede interoperability, a heavy burden falls
on those attempting to make use of that information. To do so,
developers must either reverse engineer or license the necessary
information. Reverse engineers often contend with both technical
9
ROBERT J. GLUSHKO & TIM MCGRATH, DOCUMENT ENGINEERING: ANALYZING AND
DESIGNING DOCUMENTS FOR BUSINESS INFORMATICS AND WEB SERVICES 172 (2005)
(“Interoperability doesn’t require that two systems be identical in design or
implementation, only that they can exchange information and use the information
they exchange.”).
10
Even if developers of two systems fail to establish interoperability on their own
initiative, third parties can step in to bridge the gap. By establishing interoperability
with each of the two systems, a third party can render those two systems interoperable
with each other.
11
Such steps could include the introduction of unnecessary complexity intended
to thwart interoperability or the updating of protocols or specifications to interfere
with existing interoperability.
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complexity and intentional obfuscation that renders their efforts more
difficult. Further, licensing may entail prohibitive costs, especially
when interoperability poses a competitive threat to those in possession
of the desired information.
Finally, a full description of interoperability must account for the
role of the various components of interoperable systems. Although
interoperability is typically understood as a system-level attribute,
some definitions refer to components, functional units, software, and
Likewise,
hardware as potentially interoperable objects.12
commentators sometimes speak of the importance of data
interoperability.13 However, understanding the role of data in
enabling interoperable relationships requires reflection.
A system is “[a] collection of components organized to accomplish a
specific function or set of functions.”14 These components include not
only software and hardware, but data as well. Thinking of hardware
or software as sharing usable information poses little difficulty. Just as
systems can share and use information, so can the programs that
comprise them. Data, however, does not immediately lend itself to
being characterized as sharing and using information.
Data can be conceptualized as either passive or active. The passive
view holds that data conveys information only after it has been
processed or operated on by a program or other external interpreter.15
So while data may be passed from one system to another, it does not
engage in the active process of sharing usable information that defines
interoperability. This conception of data as inert suggests that
“interoperable data” simply means data presented in a manner that
facilitates the exchange of usable information between systems. Data
that is unencrypted or organized using standard formats contributes to
interoperability even if, standing alone, that data does not actively
share information.
The active view, in contrast, recognizes that the line between
program and data is often not clearly defined.16 Just as programs
12

See supra note 7.
See, e.g., Stacy Baird, The Government at the Standards Bazaar, 18 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 35, 37-41 (2007) (discussing need for data interoperability in healthcare
and national security contexts); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the
Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2376 (1994)
(“Interoperability applies to data as well.”).
14
IEEE, supra note 7, at 196.
15
See R.L. Ackoff, From Data to Wisdom, 16 J. APPLIED SYS. ANALYSIS 3, 3-4 (1989).
16
See MARTIN DAVIS, THE UNIVERSAL COMPUTER: THE ROAD FROM LEIBNIZ TO TURING
164-65 (2000) (describing distinction between program and data as illusion); Allen
Newell, The Models Are Broken, The Models Are Broken!, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1023, 1033
13
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contain instructions for the interpretation and manipulation of data,
the structure and arrangement of data is itself partly responsible for its
interpretation. From this perspective, data is not just a collection of
raw facts, but contains ordered and structured information that it can
share with interoperable systems.
The active view of data has some explanatory force. When two
programs do not interact directly, it might make more sense to think
of an interoperable relationship existing between one program and
data created by another. Imagine two word processors — Microsoft
Word and Apple’s Pages — residing on separate systems. When Pages
opens and renders a Word file, is it interoperating with an application
or data? Because Pages does not interact directly with Word,
characterizing the relationship as program-to-data interoperability
could be a more helpful conceptual tool. Regardless of which
characterization more accurately describes the role of data, both
perspectives confirm that data, just like programs, can facilitate
interoperability.
Interoperability, then, is a nonbinary description of a relationship
between two or more systems or their components — among them
hardware, software, and data — wherein information is shared and
used. With this general understanding of interoperability established,
the next subpart turns to the value of interoperability, in particular its
impact on innovation and competition.
B. Valuing Interoperability
Although the intrinsic value of interoperability is often apparent to
end-users, particularly in its absence, its value is largely instrumental.
Interoperability is typically celebrated because it fosters a number of
socially desirable ends: innovation, competition, consumer choice,
and accessibility, among others.17 Although these justifications for
promoting interoperability hold true in most cases, a fuller account of
the practical consequences of interoperability reveals considerable
complexity and nuance.18
In some instances, increased
interoperability could lower innovative and competitive incentives and
(1986) (stating that “the boundary between data and program — that is, what is data
and what is procedure — is very fluid”).
17
See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 32 (1998), (discussing the role of interoperability in
“foster[ing] competition and innovation”); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network
Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2005) (describing concern of network
neutrality advocates that “reduction in interoperability would impair the environment
for competition and innovation”).
18
See GASSER & PALFREY, supra note 7, at 18.
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undermine the strategies of firms that hope to establish exclusivity
over ancillary goods and services.
Interoperability encourages certain types of innovation, but can
reduce incentives for others. Incremental innovation, the process of
improving and extending existing technologies, benefits from the
interaction with existing products that interoperability enables.
Because incremental innovation leverages prior innovative activity, it
typically requires less investment, spurring contributions from a wider
variety and greater number of developers. Not surprisingly, these
incremental advances account for the lion’s share of innovation.19
However, interoperability potentially hampers innovators who create
new technologies from the ground up. First, the network effects that
emerge from interoperable technologies could prove difficult to
overcome, even for a superior offering.20 Second, the possibility that
follow-on innovators could interoperate and appropriate some of the
value of a revolutionary innovation could reduce incentives for
creating groundbreaking products.21
The effect of interoperability on competition is similarly
complicated. In markets that feature interoperability, barriers to entry
tend to be lower because innovations can take advantage of existing
infrastructure and customer bases. Likewise, interoperability lowers
switching costs because existing investments are not lost when
migrating to a new interoperable product. As a result of increased
competition, consumers of interoperable products tend to enjoy lower
prices and a greater number and variety of available choices.
Under some circumstances, however, interoperability can reduce
competition. Competition could suffer if a handful of firms agree to
interoperate but exclude newcomers from the resulting interoperable
network.
Further, interoperability may also discourage
Schumpeterian competition.22 Incentives to create new technologies
19
See Steve P. Calandrillo & Ewa M. Davison, The Dangers of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act: Much Ado About Nothing?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 349, 407
(2008).
20
See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and
Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 71 (1985). Network effects or network externalities
exist when the value of a good or service to a consumer increases as more consumers
utilize that good or service. See id.
21
See Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The Effects of Antitrust and IP Law on
Compatibility and Innovation, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 609, 636 (1998).
22
See Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, “Schumpeterian” Competition and
Antitrust Policy in High-Tech Markets, 14 COMPETITION 47 (2005) (“At the heart of the
Schumpeterian argument is the assertion that, in important instances, competition
primarily occurs through cycles of innovation, rather than through static price or
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that supplant the current market, rather than compete within it, are
arguably lessened where competitors are free to interoperate. Without
the promise of temporary dominance and monopoly rents, the
investment necessary for innovation-based competition is a less
attractive risk.23
Interoperability also promotes consumer access to innovation and
creative works. Other considerations being equal, information and
services are more likely to find their way into more hands in markets
that feature interoperability than those that do not. In part, increased
accessibility is an outgrowth of the reduced price and increased choice
brought about by competition. In addition, interoperability facilitates
access by allowing information to permeate technological barriers that
limit distribution. But this permeability could have unexpected
consequences. The strong network effects interoperability creates
could marginalize information excluded from a dominant network.
These potential exclusionary practices aside, generally as
interoperability increases, so too does accessibility.
These considerations suggest that the methods by which
interoperable products and services are created matter. For example,
if interoperability requires agreements between competitors,
incentives for radical innovation and dynamic competition might
increase. However, the risk of collusive behavior and barriers to entry
for incremental innovators would likely increase accordingly. On the
other hand, legal rules permitting unauthorized efforts to achieve
interoperability could have the opposite effect, spurring incremental
innovation and increased static competition.
The net impact of interoperability is a fact-intensive question and one
this Article will not endeavor to resolve fully.24 To the extent
unauthorized interoperability reduces incentives for radical innovation,
but increases incentives for incremental improvements, that question
turns, in part, on the relative value of those species of innovation and
the competition they encourage. Any such estimate must also account
for the potential disparity between the incentives currently provided by
IP regimes and those necessary to spur innovation. An optimal IP

output competition. Firms in such markets compete for temporary dominance of the
market through the introduction of new generations of relevant technology.”).
23
Imagine, for example, that prior to inventing the telephone, Bell had been
informed that rather than enjoying decades of exclusivity with respect to his incipient
technology, competitors could freely interoperate with the network his invention
would yield. Under such circumstances, Bell’s incentives to undertake the innovative
process likely would have been reduced.
24
See GASSER & PALFREY, supra note 7, at 18.

1560

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 42:1549

system offers incentives sufficient to induce innovative activity, but no
more.25 In an IP system that over-incentivizes innovators, unauthorized
interoperability could serve to reduce deadweight loss. Under such
circumstances, interoperability could eliminate unnecessary exclusivity
that inhibits competition and follow-on innovation, but does not yield
any increase in innovative activity.
Regardless of interoperability’s broadly dispersed benefits,
individual firms have strong incentives to limit interoperability with
their own offerings. Firms with large user bases and established
reputations are particularly likely to oppose interoperability for two
reasons.26 First, interoperability tends to lower barriers to entry
created by network effects.27 Second, interoperability increases the
relative value of competing products by enabling access to the
dominant network.28 Both of these effects favor less-established firms
over their larger rivals.
History offers no shortage of examples of efforts to resist
interoperability.29 Edison’s refusal to allow his records to be played on
Columbia and Victor phonographs evidenced a reluctance to permit
rivals to profit from his established network and reputation.30
Railroads offer another useful set of early examples. Czarist Russia
used railroad gauges wider than those common in Europe to slow
25
See William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1203, 1249 (1998) (arguing copyright should “give creators enough entitlements
to induce them to produce the works from which we all benefit but no more”); Glynn
S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet
Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 5 (2004) (suggesting patent protection should be
conferred only to “precise extent[] necessary to secure each individual innovation’s ex
ante expected profitability”).
26
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 425 (1985).
27
Farrell & Katz, supra note 21, at 611 (discussing tendency of network effects to
increase barriers to entry).
28
Farrell & Saloner, supra note 20, at 71.
29
Sometimes third parties that reap the benefit of inefficiencies introduced by
incompatibility, oppose interoperability. In 1853 for instance, an effort to replace the
three gauges of railroad tracks in Erie, Pennsylvania, with a uniform track width
prompted bloody riots. See Achsah Nesmith, A Long Arduous March Toward
Standardization, SMITHSONIAN MAG., Mar. 1, 1985, at 176. Local workers that
unloaded cargo, changed car wheels, and then reloaded cargo at the juncture of these
incompatible gauges rightly feared unemployment. See id.
30
Columbia and Victor records were interchangeable because their phonographs
used the same playback technology. Edison utilized a unique playback technology —
ensuring that its records could only be played on its machines — and refused to
license an adapter to allow Edison records to play on competing hardware. See
RANDALL STROSS, THE WIZARD OF MENLO PARK 219-20 (2007).
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potential invaders,31 a strategy shared by developers who rely on
proprietary formats to limit access to their platforms.32 In India, the
British laid nonuniform tracks to regionalize trade,33 a tactic not
unlike the contemporary region coding of DVDs and video games to
enable market segmentation.34
Regardless of the desires of particular firms to exercise control over
interoperable technologies, the precise social value of interoperability
remains difficult to measure. Although it spurs innovation and
competition in many instances, it may inhibit them in others. Despite
this uncertainty, as the discussion below describes, IP law operates
from the typically implicit, but occasionally explicit, assumption that
interoperability should be encouraged, or at least permitted, in most
circumstances. Nonetheless, IP doctrine reflects some sensitivity to
the potential downsides of interoperability through the greater degree
of exclusivity afforded by patent protection.
C. IP & Interoperability Policy
Trade secrecy, copyright, and patent law have each adopted their
own set of principles, rules, and exceptions that implicate
interoperable technologies. As a result, IP law does not exhibit any
explicit, unified approach to interoperability.
Nonetheless, an
articulable interoperability policy emerges from the aggregate
operation of these doctrines. That policy generally permits, and
occasionally encourages, unauthorized interoperability. This policy
infrequently interferes with attempts to create unlicensed
interoperable technologies — most notably, when a valid patent
controls the interfaces necessary for communication between two
systems. Although this policy is partly the result of specific exceptions
and defenses sensitive to interoperability concerns, it flows largely
from freestanding limits on the scope of the relevant exclusive rights.
The law of trade secrets facilitates interoperability by recognizing
reverse engineering — the process of “starting with the known
product and working backward to find the method by which it was

31

See BAND & KATOH, supra note 8, at 40-41.
The Nintendo Gamecube console, for example, was designed to accept
miniature game discs rather than standard-sized DVDs as a means to prevent use of
unauthorized copies. See Alex Pham & Jon Healey, Games Prove a Hassle for Web
Pirates, L.A. TIMES, May 17, 2003, at C1.
33
See BAND & KATOH, supra note 8, at 41.
34
See Stephen Manes, You Can’t Do That to Me!, FORBES, Oct. 30, 2006, at 82,
available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2006/1030/082.html.
32
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developed”35 — as a legitimate means to obtain information about
lawfully acquired products.36 Without reverse engineering, developers
would be unable to discover communications protocols, format
specifications, and other program interfaces that enable
interoperability.37 The favored status of reverse engineering, however,
grows out of fundamental limits on the scope of trade secret
protection, rather than any express intent to encourage
interoperability.
Likewise, the longstanding limits on the extent to which copyright
regulates interoperable technologies create a legal environment
hospitable to interoperability. First, copyright law does not grant
exclusive rights in systems or their functional components, and
excludes them from the scope of protection of otherwise protected
subject matter.38 By refusing protection for this key class of potentially
interoperable objects, copyright law avoids directly regulating

35

UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 2 (amended 1985); see Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (defining reverse engineering as “starting with
the known product and working backward to divine the process which aided in its
development or manufacture”); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law
and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1577 (May, 2002) (defining
reverse engineering as “the process of extracting know-how or knowledge from a
human-made artifact”).
36
See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 476 (recognizing reverse engineering as proper);
Nat’l Tube Co. v. E. Tube Co., 3 Ohio C.C (n.s.) 459, 462 (1902) (permitting use of
information discovered “by examination of the manufactured products sold or offered
for sale to the public”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995);
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 2 (stating reverse engineering is proper if product
was acquired by “fair and honest means”).
37
See, e.g., Secure Serv. Tech., Inc. v. Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp.
1354, 1361 (E.D. Va. 1989) (permitting reverse engineering of secure facsimile
machines to discover implementation of communications protocol necessary for
interoperability). In the business-to-business context, when products are made
available only to those who have agreed to terms prohibiting disclosure or reverse
engineering, rather than the public at large, such acts face more substantial challenges.
See ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.05[5][III] (2004) (discussing
likelihood that contractual terms could render reverse engineering improper in some
circumstances).
38
See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (holding that copyright in text
describing system of accounting did not extend to system itself); see also Perris v.
Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 675 (1878) (holding that copyright in map “marked with
arbitrary coloring and signs” was not infringed by map using similar system).
Congress codified Baker’s holding in the Copyright Act of 1976. See 17 U.S.C. §
102(b) (2006). For a detailed discussion of Baker, its progeny, and their implications
for the scope of copyright protection, see Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law
Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921,
1921-77 (2007).
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interoperability.39 The originality requirement,40 the doctrines of
merger, scènes à faire,41 and copyright misuse likewise contribute to
copyright’s permissiveness regarding interoperability.42
Copyright law also avoids interference with interoperability by
limiting the extent to which its exclusive rights reach users of
copyrighted works and developers of technology. The mere use of
lawfully acquired copies of protected works — as opposed to their
reproduction and distribution — typically falls outside of the
copyright holder’s statutory monopoly.43 Simply put, copyright
39

See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding
that menu command hierarchy of spreadsheet application was method of operation),
aff’d by an equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233, 233 (1996); Brown Instrument Co. v.
Warner, 161 F.2d 910, 910-11 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (holding chart that served as
component of measuring device ineligible for copyright protection); Taylor
Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1943) (holding that
chart used as component of apparatus that measured and recorded temperatures was
“as indispensable to the operation of a recording thermometer as are any of the other
elements,” and thus “not the proper subject of copyright”); see also Samuelson, supra
note 38, at 1936-37 (discussing Taylor).
40
The originality requirement reinforces Baker by limiting copyright protection
for the output of an unprotectable system. See, e.g., ATC Distrib. v. Whatever It Takes
Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 707 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that system
of numbering transmission parts was ineligible for copyright protection as either
taxonomy or compilation of data); Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276,
282 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc) (holding that serial numbers for identifying parts were
characterized by “an utter absence of creativity,” and allowing distributors of
interchangeable parts to utilize identical numbers); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d
1366, 1376 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that command codes used to program
telecommunications hardware were unoriginal, allowing competitor to use
interoperable codes). But see ADA v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th
Cir. 1997) (holding that taxonomy of medical codes was original).
41
Applied to computer programs, the merger and scènes à faire doctrines suggest
that if a limited number of options exist to achieve a given function efficiently,
interoperate with another application, or run in a given environment, copyright will
not permit exclusive control over those program elements. See Computer Assocs. Int’l
v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709-10 (2nd Cir. 1992) (holding that merger doctrine
precludes exclusive rights in structural choices dictated by efficiency, and analogizing
programming constraints dictated by external hardware compatibility and
interoperability requirements to those recognized by scènes à faire doctrine).
42
See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc. 166 F.3d 772, 792-94 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that reasonable juror could have concluded that license agreement that
prevented development of interoperable products was misuse of copyright because it
resulted in patent-like protections for unpatented devices).
43
See Stover v. Lathrop, 33 F. 348, 349 (C.C.D. Colo. 1888) (holding that “the effect
of a copyright is not to prevent any reasonable use of the book which is sold . . . merely
using it, in no manner infringes upon the copyright”). Of course, public performance
and display of a work crosses the line separating unregulated private use and a public
exploitation within the copyright grant. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), (5) (2006).
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provides no exclusive right to read.44 Without the power to dictate the
circumstances under which consumers read books, listen to records,
or watch films, copyright holders are poorly positioned to control the
use of interoperable technologies. Even where the use of such
technologies gives rise to direct infringement by a user, limits on
indirect liability insulate developers in most instances.45
But not all copyright rules favoring interoperability grow out of
independent constraints on the scope of copyright protection. The
reverse engineering privilege more explicitly recognizes the value of
interoperability and copyright’s role in promoting it. Although the
discovery of unprotected program elements through reverse
engineering often requires the literal copying of protected expression,
courts regard such copying as a fair use when undertaken to achieve
interoperability.46 This willingness to enlist the fair use defense to
address threats to interoperability suggests that copyright not only
tolerates interoperable technologies, but also promotes them.
Patent protection offers rights holders the most direct means of
asserting control over interoperable technologies. Nonetheless, much
like trade secrecy and copyright, patent law avoids directly regulating
interoperability in most cases. The creation of products that
interoperate with patented inventions does not infringe unless it
entails making, using, or selling the patented invention.47 Although
the Patent Act neither expressly prohibits nor permits reverse
engineering,48 the exhaustion doctrine ensures that purchasers are free
44
But see Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
29, 31-32 (1994) (warning that expansive reading of reproduction right in digital
environment could lead to copyright holder control over act of reading and other
personal uses).
45
Indirect liability enables copyright holders to exert control over the distribution
and use of technologies that give rise to end-user infringement under four
circumstances: first, if the distributor had actual knowledge of specific instances of
infringement and failed to act on that knowledge; second, if the technology at issue is
incapable of substantial noninfringing use, see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 490-93 (1984); third, if the distributor of that technology
intentionally encourages or induces end-user infringement, see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935-36 (2005); or fourth, if the
distributor possesses the legal right and practical ability to control end-user
infringement and enjoys a direct financial benefit from such infringement, see Perfect
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Grokster, 545
U.S. at 930).
46
See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that copying necessary to engage in reverse engineering was fair use); infra
Part II.B.
47
See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
48
Id. (defining patent infringement and omitting any reference to acts of reverse
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to use a patented product once lawfully sold.49 Such use could include
reverse engineering to achieve interoperability.
In the software context, however, patents may offer greater
opportunities to restrict interoperability. First, reverse engineering
software may entail copying or “making” the invention rather than
merely using it, potentially rendering an exhaustion defense
unavailable.50 Second, given the prevalence of licensing agreements in
the software context, such licenses could override the exhaustion
principle to the extent courts treat unilateral prohibitions on reverse
engineering as enforceable license limitations.51 These concerns aside,
patents most directly threaten the creation of unauthorized
interoperable technologies when they cover interfaces that define
communication between two systems. If a particular protocol or
process is necessary to exchange information with a device or program
and a valid patent controls that interface, interoperability requires the
patent holder’s permission.52
However, even acknowledging the role of patents, IP law
infrequently interferes with unauthorized attempts to achieve
interoperability. Some of the doctrines that contribute to this
overarching policy are longstanding limits on the scope of IP rights;
others are of more recent vintage and reflect direct judicial awareness
of the value of interoperability. As the next Part details, the DMCA
engineering).
49
See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1942) (holding
when patent holder made first unrestricted sale of patented item, its exclusive rights
with respect to that particular item were exhausted).
50
Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2001) (noting that reverse engineering computer
program by decompilation could constitute infringing “making,” but urging courts to
reject this approach).
51
See Bowers v. BayState Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323-25 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(enforcing anti-reverse engineering clause of software license); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 707-09 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that label reading
“single use only” established a conditional sale sufficient to overcome exhaustion).
But see Cohen & Lemley, supra note 50, at 33-34 (noting that courts have been
divided on role of unilateral license provisions in altering application of exhaustion
principles); Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 35, at 1630 (suggesting that courts
should avoid enforcing anti-reverse engineering provisions to the extent they create
“detrimental effect on competitive development and innovation”).
52
See Pamela Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?, 93
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 16-19, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323838) (discussing impact of interface patents on
interoperability); see, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d
(BNA) 1401, 1414-15 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that development of interoperable
product infringed interface patent).
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embodies a dramatic shift away from IP law’s general receptiveness to
interoperability. The DMCA facilitates unprecedented control over
interoperable devices and services without any compelling justification
for its departure from the interoperability policy that emerged in prior
decades.
II.

ANTICIRCUMVENTION & INTEROPERABILITY

As network communication and digital copying technologies
increased the threat of infringement, copyright holders expressed
reluctance to distribute their works on the Internet in the absence of
additional legal protections to “make digital networks safe places to
disseminate and exploit copyrighted materials.”53 Reflecting these
fears, two World Intellectual Property Organization treaties called for
“adequate legal protection” against the circumvention of technological
protection measures (“TPM”).54 Congress, ostensibly to implement its
treaty obligations, enacted the DMCA in 1998.55
The DMCA defines two types of technological controls and two
restrictions on their manipulation. Access controls are technological
measures intended to prevent unauthorized access to copyrighted
works. Copy controls are measures intended to prevent infringement
of the exclusive rights afforded by copyright.56 The DMCA regulates
both circumvention — the act of decrypting an encrypted work, or
otherwise disabling, removing, or avoiding a technological measure57
— and trafficking — the manufacture, distribution, sale, or offering to
the public of devices, tools, or technologies that enable
circumvention.58 With respect to access controls, the DMCA prohibits
53

S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17
(1997), 36 I.L.M. 65, 84 (1997); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 18,
Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 76, 86 (1997)
55
Arguably, implementing legislation was unnecessary in the United States
because indirect copyright infringement liability reached the production and
distribution of circumvention devices incapable of substantial noninfringing uses. See
Pamela Samuelson, Why the Anti-Circumvention Rules Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 519, 531-32 (1999).
56
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B), (b)(2)(B) (2006). These two varieties of TPMs often
overlap in practice, and courts struggle to classify them. See, e.g., Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 438 n.5 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating TPM is copy
control even though “it might very well be that copying is not blocked”); 321 Studios
v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (stating TPM is
copy control if copying allowed “is not particularly useful”).
57
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
58
Id. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1). The trafficking bans apply to devices: (1) primarily
54
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both circumvention and trafficking in circumvention technologies.59
The DMCA likewise bans trafficking in technologies that circumvent
copy controls.60 The act of circumventing a copy control, while not
prohibited by § 1201, may constitute copyright infringement.
This Part considers the impact of these prohibitions on
interoperability. Because the DMCA enables broad rights-holder
control over interoperable technologies, it deviates from IP law’s
traditional treatment of interoperability. Recognizing the DMCA’s
potential impact, Congress enacted § 1201(f) as a statutory exemption
designed to limit the extent to which anticircumvention law disturbed
existing interoperability policy. Both Congress and the courts,
however, have undermined § 1201(f)’s effectiveness. First, courts
have misinterpreted several of its basic requirements, encouraging
overreaching claims far exceeding the scope of the DMCA’s core
concerns. Second, Congress chose to limit the scope of § 1201(f) to
computer programs, a policy choice that rendered § 1201(f) ill
equipped to safeguard interoperability fully.
A. The DMCA’s Departure from Existing Interoperability Policy
As Congress intended, the DMCA addresses activities that, if
unfettered, could have discouraged the development of robust digital
marketplaces for copyrighted works. By virtue of its breadth,
however, the DMCA gives rise to a number of unintended
consequences, including restricting interoperability.61 Rather than
allowing or encouraging interoperability in the absence of an
applicable patent right, the DMCA enables those who employ TPMs to
restrict the development, distribution, and use of interoperable
technologies.
The DMCA, of course, does not prohibit interoperability.
Developers remain free to interoperate with systems that do not
incorporate TPMs. Likewise, the DMCA permits interoperation with
TPM-restricted works so long as access and copying are authorized.
designed for circumvention; (2) with only limited commercially significant uses aside
from circumvention; or (3) marketed for use in circumvention. Id.
59
Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A), (a)(2).
60
Id. § 1201(b)(1).
61
See John A. Rothchild, The Social Costs of Technological Protection Measures, 34
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1181, 1198-1204 (2007) (discussing various negative externalities
resulting from use of TPMs). See generally ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES: TEN YEARS UNDER THE DMCA (2008), http://www.eff.org/files/
DMCAUnintended10.pdf (reporting cases in which DMCA’s anticircumvention
provisions were used to suppress legitimate activities).
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Developers that enable interoperability with works restricted by TPMs
without the permission of the relevant rights holders, however, face
potential liability under the DMCA.
The restraints on unilateral efforts to achieve interoperability are
threefold. First, the DMCA discourages the creation of unauthorized
interoperable products by prohibiting certain acts of reverse
engineering.62 The DMCA’s circumvention ban functions at its core as a
bar against the reverse engineering of products containing effective
access controls.63 To interoperate with a work protected by such a
control, a developer must discover interface information through
reverse engineering. Those acts of reverse engineering generally require
access to the underlying work. But a developer that “avoid[s],
bypass[es], remove[s], deactivate[s], or impair[s]” a TPM to gain access
and obtain interoperability information risks violation of § 1201.64
Second, the DMCA adversely affects interoperability by prohibiting
the distribution of interoperable products.65 To interoperate with a
work that incorporates an effective TPM, a product must include code
that enables access or copying of the protected work. Otherwise, it
would lack the ability to exchange information with the TPMprotected system. Products designed to access or copy a work
protected by an effective TPM, however, are subject to the trafficking
ban. Thus, the distribution of a product that interoperates with a
work protected by a technological measure could constitute an
independent violation of § 1201. Third, because the use of such a
product could entail an act of circumvention, the DMCA exposes end
users to potential liability for utilizing devices that enable
interoperability.
In short, creating, distributing, or using products that interoperate
with works restricted by effective TPMs may violate the circumvention
or trafficking bans. 66 As a result, in the absence of any applicable
62

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
An access control is effective if “in the ordinary course of its operation, [it]
requires the application of information, or a process or a treatment” before access to
the underlying work is granted. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B). Copy controls must meet
an even lower bar. They are effective “if the measure, in the ordinary course of its
operation, prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits the exercise of a right of a copyright
owner under this title.” Id. § 1201(b)(2)(B).
64
Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
65
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) & (b)(1).
66
Imagine, for example, a device that enables unauthorized playback of TPMrestricted video content purchased from an online retailer. To create such a product,
its developers would most likely reverse engineer the TPM system to understand its
authentication system, likely engaging in one or more acts of circumvention in the
63
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defense, the DMCA entitles copyright holders, TPM developers, or
mere licensees to prevent the emergence of interoperable products so
long as their protection measures satisfy the minimal statutory
This potential for control over
threshold for effectiveness.67
interoperable technologies represents a marked departure from the
treatment of interoperability under earlier IP doctrine. By yielding
power over the development and distribution of products that
interface with TPM-protected works, the DMCA results in control
over interoperable technologies on par with that conferred by a patent
grant.68 But unlike a patent, which must satisfy the comparatively
exacting standards of novelty and nonobviousness, an effective TPM
must only restrict access and copying in the ordinary course of
operation.69 As a result, the DMCA offers a far less demanding path to
exclusive control over interoperable technologies.
B. Section 1201(f): The Interoperability Exemption
The DMCA’s potential restraint of interoperability did not go
unnoticed during the congressional debate.70 Software industry
groups argued that the DMCA would undermine Sega v. Accolade,71 a
case decided just six years earlier that vindicated the reverse
engineering of software programs.72 In response, Congress enacted
§ 1201(f) to preserve the right to reverse engineer computer programs
for interoperability purposes.

process. To the extent the resulting device is designed to bypass that authentication
system to ensure interoperability with TPM-restricted videos, the developers face
potential liability under the DMCA’s trafficking bans. Finally, if the device enables
circumvention, each time an end user plays back a protected video, that user arguably
engages in an act of circumvention.
67
See supra note 63.
68
See Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 570 (2005) (suggesting “the anti-circumvention
provisions may therefore play the role that patents sometimes play in suppressing
device interoperation”).
69
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B), (b)(2)(B).
70
In addition to addressing concerns over interoperability, Congress attempted to
limit the reach of the DMCA by creating a number of statutory exemptions protecting
activities including encryption research and security testing. See id. § 1201(d)-(j). In
addition, the DMCA permits the Librarian of Congress to define temporary
exemptions from the circumvention ban for specific classes of copyrighted works if
their noninfringing use has been adversely affected. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(C).
71
JONATHAN BAND, INTEROPERABILITY UNDER THE DMCA 12 (2008), available at
http://files.ali-aba.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/TSPV09_chapter_02_thumb.pdf.
72
See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992).
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In Sega, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that creating
intermediate copies of a computer program during reverse engineering
was a fair use when undertaken to isolate unprotected program
elements.73 Sega developed the Genesis, a home video game console,
and licensed third-party developers to create compatible games.
Accolade, unwilling to agree to Sega’s licensing terms, decided to
create games interoperable with the Genesis system without Sega’s
assistance or approval. Instead, Accolade reverse engineered Genesis
games to determine the console’s interoperability requirements,
creating copies of Sega’s code in the process. Accolade then used the
interface information gleaned from Sega’s code to create its own
interoperable games.74 Sega sued Accolade, maintaining that the
intermediate copying of its code in the reverse engineering process
constituted copyright infringement.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Sega that intermediate copying of
software programs was a prima facie violation of the reproduction
right.75 Nonetheless, the court recognized that reverse engineering,
and the attendant intermediate copying, were “the only means of
gaining access to . . . unprotected aspects of the program” necessary to
achieve interoperability.76 Accordingly, the court held that Accolade’s
copying was a fair use.77 While acknowledging that other legitimate
interests could justify reverse engineering, Sega unambiguously
identifies interoperability as worthy of promotion.78 Other courts
followed suit, holding that copying necessary for reverse engineering
is a fair use.79
Software companies worried that the DMCA would allow platform
developers like Sega to exclude unauthorized developers from
achieving interoperability by veiling their works behind even the
thinnest of technological measures. Sega, in fact, employed a
73

Id. at 1527.
Id. at 1515.
75
Id. at 1519.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 1520.
78
Id.
79
See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that intermediate copying was necessary to reverse engineer
BIOS of Sony Playstation to “gain access to [its] unprotected functional elements”);
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(“Reverse engineering, untainted by the purloined copy of the 10NES program and
necessary to understand 10NES, is a fair use.”). But see Compaq Computer Corp. v.
Procom Tech., 908 F. Supp. 1409, 1419-21 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that reverse
engineering and copying plaintiff’s hard drive threshold values was not fair use).
74

2009]

Rethinking Anticircumvention’s Interoperability Policy

1571

rudimentary protection measure to thwart the use of unlicensed games
on its Genesis console.80 Six years before the DMCA however,
Accolade had no legal obligation to respect that restraint.81 Developers
understandably viewed a broad anticircumvention right as a threat to
the freedom to interoperate endorsed by the Ninth Circuit in Sega.
Congress heeded these concerns by including an exemption to both
the circumvention and trafficking bans meant to “ensure that the
effect of [Sega] is not changed by enactment” of the DMCA.82
Congress’s intention to “allow legitimate software developers to
continue engaging in certain activities for the purpose of achieving
interoperability to the extent permitted by law prior to the enactment
of [the DMCA]” represented explicit congressional recognition of the
permissibility of reverse engineering and the value of
interoperability.83
Section 1201(f)(1) allows the circumvention of access controls if:
(1) those controls restrict access to portions of a computer program;
(2) the circumventor lawfully acquired a copy of that program; (3)
circumvention occurs for the sole purpose of identifying and analyzing
program elements necessary to achieve interoperability; (4)
interoperability is sought with an independently created program; (5)
the information obtained through reverse engineering is not otherwise
readily available; and (6) the identification and analysis of the
underlying
work
does
not
constitute
infringement.84
Section 1201(f)(2) allows the development and use of technologies
that enable circumvention to the extent necessary to achieve

80

See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1528.
See id.
82
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 32 (1998), (citing Sega, 977 F.2d 1510). But § 1201(f),
while titled the “Reverse Engineering” exemption, does not privilege all acts of reverse
engineering, but only acts undertaken to achieve interoperability. Sega strongly
suggests that reverse engineers with other legitimate rationales for identifying
unprotected program elements could benefit from the fair use defense as well. See
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1520. As a result, § 1201(f) does not permit reverse engineering to
the full extent of prior law, but only under a limited subset of the circumstances
permitted under Sega. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital
Millennium”, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 149 n.35 (1999) (suggesting that §
1201(f) might not embrace all reverse engineering permitted under prior law).
83
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 32.
84
17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1) (2006). The language and basic requirements of §
1201(f) borrow heavily from Article Six of the EU Software Directive. See Council
Directive 91/250/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42 (EC); see also Jonathan Band & Taro
Isshiki, The New Anti-Circumvention Provisions in the Copyright Act: A Flawed First
Step, 3 CYBER LAW. 2 (1999).
81
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interoperability.85 Further, circumventors may distribute information
lawfully acquired, or tools lawfully developed, for the sole purpose of
enabling interoperability.86
Early § 1201 litigation demonstrated that Congress’s concern over
safeguarding interoperability was warranted. The very first complaint
alleging violation of § 1201, as well as an early companion suit,
targeted interoperable products created through reverse engineering.87
Sony developed and marketed the Playstation, a video game console
that played games stored on CD-ROM. Two companies, Connectix
and Bleem, developed software emulators that allowed the owners of
Playstation discs to play those games on their computers.88 While the
emulators were similar enough to the Playstation to enable crossplatform game play, Connectix and Bleem did not copy every element
of the Playstation’s internals. According to Sony, the emulators
ignored an access control built into the Playstation platform — an
authorization code on each disc. If a game disc did not contain this
code, the Playstation refused to load it. Sony argued that because the
emulators did not scan for this code, Connectix and Bleem
circumvented a TPM that controlled access to Playstation games.89
85
17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(2). Arguably the protections offered by § 1201(f) do not
extend to end users of circumvention technologies, but only to their developers.
Although § 1201(f)(2) permits one to “employ technological means to circumvent a
technological measure . . . for the purpose of enabling interoperability,” that subsection
refers only to § 1201’s antitrafficking provisions, not its anticircumvention provision.
Id. The omission of a specific reference to circumvention liability in § 1201(f)(2) is
peculiar for at least two reasons. First, one who “employs” a circumvention tool
appears to be engaged in acts of circumvention rather than acts of trafficking, rendering
defenses to the antitrafficking provisions inapposite. Second, the failure to extend
protection against circumvention liability to end users would seem to undermine the
purpose of exempting developers of circumvention tools. Developers would enjoy
immunity for reverse engineering to obtain interoperability information, creating
circumvention tools, and distributing those tools to enable interoperability. But
consumers would still face liability for utilizing those admittedly privileged tools, a
rather curious result. To the extent a literal reading of § 1201(f)(2) demands such a
counterintuitive result, the statutory text should be revised. See infra note 266.
86
Id. § 1201(f)(3).
87
See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 61, at 11; see also Band & Isshiki, supra
note 84 (noting that Sony’s complaint against Connectix was first to allege
circumvention violations under § 1201).
88
The Connectix and Bleem emulators were developed for the Mac and Windows
operating systems, respectively. To achieve interoperability, Connectix reverse
engineered the copyrighted Playstation BIOS, an act ultimately deemed a fair use by
the Ninth Circuit. See Sony Computer Entm’t Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596,
609 (9th Cir. 2000).
89
See Hearing on Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright
Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 222-23 (2000) (testimony of
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Sony’s anticircumvention theory, however, was deeply flawed.
Because any standard CD-ROM drive could read Playstation game
data, it is far from clear that the Playstation authorization code
functioned as an effective access control.90 Thus, the “no mandate”
provision of the DMCA freed the emulators of any obligation to
comply with the Playstation authentication code.91 In addition, Sony
filed its complaints during the initial two-year moratorium on
enforcement of the DMCA’s circumvention ban.92 Not surprisingly,
Sony ultimately chose to abandon its § 1201 claims.93
Assuming Sony could have overcome these threshold obstacles,94
the emulator cases would have provided an opportunity for courts to
Jonathan Hangartner), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/hearings/1201-519.pdf.
The source of Sony’s hostility towards emulation is worth pausing to consider.
Sony may have feared that emulators would encourage infringement of Playstation
games, a worry of the very sort Congress hoped to alleviate with the DMCA. On the
other hand, Sony may have feared that emulation offered the emerging PC gaming
platform a competitive advantage. With the introduction of emulators, PC gamers
could play the entire stock of Playstation games in addition to games developed
specifically for the PC. If PCs became the dominant gaming platform, Sony risked
losing a sizable portion of its revenues — in the form of reduced console sales and
decreased licensing revenue — as consumers and game developers defected to the PC
platform. Tellingly, after losing its copyright infringement suit against Connectix,
Sony purchased the company, eventually discontinuing the emulation software rather
than implement support for the Playstation authorization code. See Peter Cohen, Sony
Acquires Virtual Game Station from Connectix, MACWORLD, Mar. 15, 2001,
http://www.macworld.com/article/20791/2001/03/vgs.html;
Sony
Computer
Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., http://www.coolcopyright.com/cases/chp7/
sonyconnectix.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2009). Regardless of Sony’s motivation, its
anticircumvention claims would have resulted in control over interoperable
technologies regardless of either copyright or patent infringement, control not
envisioned by Congress when it enacted the DMCA.
90
Standard CD-ROM drives do not read the region of the disc containing the
authentication code, so the fact that the emulators did not acknowledge the code is
not surprising. See Hearing on Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright
Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, supra note 89, at 222-23.
91
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(3).
92
Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
93
Sony continued its litigation against Connectix and Bleem on other theories.
See Connectix, 203 F.3d at 609 (holding that reverse engineering of PlayStation BIOS
by Connectix was fair use); Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d
1022, 1030 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Bleem’s use of screen shots from PlayStation
games was fair use).
94
Sony eventually succeeded in enforcing Playstation access controls under the
DMCA. See Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. GameMasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976,
987-88 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (enjoining vendor of Game Enhancer device that allowed
players to load games intended for foreign markets). Notably, Sony offered no proof
that the Game Enhancer enabled infringement, only that it interfered with Sony’s
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apply § 1201(f) to facts similar to those that motivated its creation.
The activities of Bleem and Connectix — reverse engineering a
console to discover the technical requirements for interoperability —
shared obvious similarities to the conduct at issue in Sega. In fact, the
Ninth Circuit eventually held that Connectix was entitled to the Sega
fair use defense for its reverse engineering of the Playstation console.95
The Playstation emulators present a fairly simple § 1201(f) analysis.
Sony’s alleged protection measure restricted access to Playstation
games, computer programs lawfully acquired by Connectix and Bleem.
The reverse engineering appears to have occurred for the sole purpose
of obtaining information necessary to render Playstation games
interoperable with independently created emulators. Further, §
1201(f)(1) would have permitted circumvention because these acts of
reverse engineering did not constitute infringement — so long as the
interoperability information was not readily available. Moreover, the
distribution of the emulator software, assuming it enabled acts of
circumvention, would have been privileged so long as facilitating
interoperability was the sole purpose of its distribution.
The first case to consider § 1201(f), Universal City Studios v.
Reimerdes, presented very different facts. The defendants were
accused of distributing DeCSS, an application that defeated the
Content Scramble System (“CSS”) designed to prevent unlicensed
players from decrypting and playing DVD movies.96 According to the
defendants, DeCSS fell within the protections of § 1201(f) because it
enabled DVDs to interoperate with playback software written for
Linux operating systems.97
The Reimerdes court offered expansive readings of the DMCA’s
liability provisions and narrow interpretations of its various defenses,
among them § 1201(f).98 The court’s primary basis for rejecting
defendants’ § 1201(f) defense, one supported by both the text and
legislative history of the provision, was that § 1201(f) applies only to
the circumvention of protection measures that restrict access to

market segmentation strategy. Id.; see also Sony v. Divineo, 457 F. Supp. 2d 957, 968
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (granting summary judgment against defendants who trafficked in
Playstation modification chips).
95
Connectix, 203 F.3d at 609.
96
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
97
Id. at 218.
98
See id.; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (asserting that DMCA “fundamentally altered the landscape” of
copyright).
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computer programs, not copyrighted works generally.99 Because CSS
restricted access to movies stored on DVDs, not computer programs, §
1201(f) did not apply. Had the court been satisfied with this decisive
rationale, there would be little reason to criticize its § 1201(f) analysis.
But Reimerdes considered additional elements of the interoperability
defense, muddying the waters for future courts.
First, the court appeared to heighten the already demanding sole
purpose requirement of § 1201(f) — that any acts of reverse
engineering be undertaken for the “sole purpose” of achieving
interoperability. Defendants argued that DeCSS was necessary to
enable interoperability with Linux-based DVD player software. At the
time, no licensed Linux-compatible DVD players were available,
preventing Linux users from viewing lawfully purchased DVDs on
their computers.100 DeCSS, however, ran under both Windows and
Linux. Because Windows users faced no shortage of authorized DVD
players, the court concluded that DeCSS was not developed solely to
enable interoperability.101 Given defendants’ emphasis on Linux-based
players, the court’s concern over Windows compatibility is
understandable. In addition, the court likely recognized the risk that
defendants might invoke interoperability as a pretext to legitimize
circumvention aimed at infringement. Even acknowledging this
worry, the mere fact that DeCSS could enable interoperability on both
platforms, standing alone, reveals little about the purpose of its
development. To the extent Reimerdes suggests that the sole purpose
requirement demands a showing that interoperability is necessary to
access or use a work, it misapplies the statute.
Second, the court misconstrued the limits on distribution of
interoperability information and circumvention tools under §
1201(f)(3). Ignoring the plain language of § 1201(f), the court
claimed the statute permitted dissemination of information obtained
through reverse engineering, but not the means of circumvention used
to obtain such information.102 The court also erred in imposing a
blanket rule against the public distribution of exempted tools and
information.103 The statute contains no express ban against public
dissemination. Instead, it permits information lawfully obtained
through reverse engineering, as well as exempted circumvention tools,
to be made available so long as the sole purpose requirement is
99
100
101
102
103

See Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 218; infra Part II.D.3.
See DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 189 (Ct. App. 2004).
See Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 218.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(2)-(3) (2006).
See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 320.
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satisfied.104 A defendant who makes information or tools widely
available might face more difficulty meeting this requirement than one
who makes a more limited disclosure, but the statute imposes no
freestanding limit on the scope of distribution.
Since Reimerdes, § 1201(f) has been the subject of surprisingly little
judicial analysis. In light of the interoperability concerns looming in
many DMCA disputes, one would expect a higher frequency of
§ 1201(f)-based defenses. Nonetheless, only a handful of published
opinions refer to § 1201(f), and no defendant has yet succeeded on a §
1201(f) defense. In the years following the DMCA’s enactment,
Reimerdes offered the sole judicial analysis of § 1201(f). The approach
to DMCA interpretation embodied by Reimerdes, characterized by an
expansive application of the DMCA’s liability provisions and
skepticism towards its statutory exemptions, has emboldened plaintiffs
to test the bounds of their control over interoperable products.105
C. The Durable Goods Cases
Early DMCA litigation focusing on entertainment content, while
arguably protecting legitimate copyright interests, evinced a desire on
the part of some plaintiffs to interfere with interoperable
technologies.106 As consumer electronics manufacturers began to
enforce TPMs incorporated in their products however, any pretense of
protecting against the threat of Internet-based infringement was
abandoned. Courts ultimately proved hostile to these efforts to
suppress interoperability, but failed to clarify the application of §
1201(f) in the process.
Lexmark International v. Static Control Components addressed one of
the first attempts to incorporate TPMs into durable goods.107
Lexmark, a manufacturer of laser and inkjet printers, like many of its
competitors, sold printers cheap, but charged a premium for ink
cartridges. To lessen incentives to refill empty cartridges or purchase
cartridges refilled by third parties, Lexmark sold “prebate” cartridges
at a deep discount in exchange for an agreement that consumers
104
The court claimed that § 1201(f) permits the sharing of interoperability
information only by one who acquires that information.
105
See Jerome H. Reichman et al., A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable
Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
981, 1005-06, 1024 (2007).
106
See Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1110-11
(2003) (discussing anticompetitive uses of DMCA); Burk, supra note 68, at 561-65
(same).
107
387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
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would use the cartridge only once and return it to Lexmark.108
Lexmark employed a TPM intended to prevent unauthorized
cartridges from interoperating with its printers.109
Lexmark alleged that Static Control Components (“SCC”), creator
of the SMARTEK chip, which mimicked Lexmark’s authentication
sequence, was trafficking in a circumvention device.110 According to
Lexmark, the operation of its printers relied on the Printer Engine
Program (“PEP”). If users installed a non-Lexmark cartridge, the
authentication sequence would fail, rendering inaccessible those
portions of the PEP that enabled printer functionality. The SMARTEK
chip bypassed this control and allegedly enabled unauthorized access
to the PEP.111
Although the District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky
granted Lexmark’s request for a preliminary injunction,112 the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals regarded Lexmark’s argument with palpable
skepticism. The court eventually concluded that § 1201 did not apply
to Lexmark’s technology at all.
According to the court, the
authentication sequence did not control access to the PEP, which was
neither encrypted nor otherwise protected against literal copying.113
Because the authentication sequence did not meaningfully control
access to the code, the DMCA simply did not apply.114
In Chamberlain Group v. Skylink, the Federal Circuit faced a similar
theory.115 Chamberlain manufactured the Security+ garage door
opener (“GDO”) system, which utilized a “rolling code” to modify the
signal used by Chamberlain’s remote transmitter to activate the
GDO.116 Skylink marketed universal remotes designed to interoperate

108
This agreement took the form of a shrink-wrap license on the cartridge
packaging. Id. at 530. Non-prebate cartridges, which were not subject to this
restriction, could be purchased at a higher price. Id.
109
Each time a printer was turned on, the printer and cartridge initiated an
authentication sequence whereby each would calculate a code using an encryption
algorithm. Id. If the codes matched, the printer accepted the cartridge and operated
normally. Id. If the authentication sequence failed, the printer would not operate. Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943,
974 (E.D. Ky. 2003). SCC admitted that its SMARTEK chips avoided or bypassed
Lexmark’s authentication sequence, and that they were designed to do so. Id. at 968.
113
Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 546-47. Instead, according to the court, access was
controlled by the purchase of a Lexmark printer. Id.
114
Id. at 548.
115
381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
116
Id. at 1183.
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with a variety of GDO systems, including the Security+ line.117
Chamberlain filed suit, alleging that Skylink’s universal transmitter
violated the DMCA’s anticircumvention provision.
Under
Chamberlain’s theory, the rolling code system controlled access to the
copyrighted code that operated its Security+ GDOs. By imitating the
rolling code, Skylink transmitters permitted unauthorized access to
the software that operated Chamberlain’s GDOs. The district court
rejected Chamberlain’s theory, holding that consumers who purchased
Chamberlain products were entitled to access the GDO software.118
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed that Chamberlain customers
possessed an “inherent legal right to use” the software embedded in
their GDOs.119 Perhaps more importantly, the court held that to
maintain an action under § 1201, a plaintiff must establish not only that
an effective TPM restricts access to a copyrighted work, but that the
circumvention of that TPM bears some “reasonable relationship to the
protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords.”120 Because
consumers were entitled to access the GDO software, Chamberlain was
unable to prove “the critical nexus between” the access facilitated by
Skylink’s device and the protection of a legitimate copyright interest.121
Together Lexmark and Chamberlain placed important limits on the
scope of anticircumvention liability, but they left some questions
unresolved. Lexmark, because of the technical and fact-specific basis of
its holding, could allow future plaintiffs to succeed under slightly
different facts. After all, if Lexmark had restricted access to the PEP
more fully, perhaps by encrypting the program code, its § 1201 claim
could have moved forward. Judge Merritt’s concurrence took pains to
warn that future litigants could not escape the court’s hostility to similar
claims through minor variations on the Lexmark facts.122 How such
permutations will be analyzed by future courts remains to be seen.
Chamberlain suffers from the opposite problem. Rather than being
tied to specific facts, the Federal Circuit’s nexus requirement offers
courts and litigants limited guidance as to the factual and legal

117
Rather than implementing an identical rolling code sequence, Skylink
transmitters sent three signals in rapid succession that reset the rolling code sequence
and activated the opener. Id. at 1184.
118
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045-46
(N.D. Ill. 2003).
119
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1202.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 1204.
122
See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 55152 (6th Cir. 2004) (Merritt, J., concurring).
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predicates necessary for liability. Although the Federal Circuit held in
a subsequent case that a defense under § 117 of the Copyright Act
undermined the nexus,123 the boundaries of the requirement remain
largely undefined.
Lexmark and Chamberlain, although decided on different grounds,
were motivated by a common set of concerns. Lingering below the
surface of both cases were overarching worries over competition and
interoperability that explain both courts’ eagerness to deny protection
under § 1201. Ultimately, Lexmark and Chamberlain had little
interest in protecting their code from unauthorized access or copying.
Instead, access to their works served as a convenient predicate for
DMCA enforcement meant to protect aftermarkets for interoperable
products.
Both courts worried that by adding fragments of
copyrighted code to consumer goods, manufacturers could “gain the
right to restrict consumers’ rights to use [their] products in
conjunction with competing products.”124 Such power, in turn, could
“create monopolies of manufactured goods”125 that relied on the
DMCA to provide “broad exemptions from . . . the antitrust laws.”126
Despite the role interoperability played in motivating the Lexmark
and Chamberlain courts, and the fact that § 1201(f) was briefed in
both cases, neither court relied on the defense nor thoroughly
analyzed its application.127 The district court in Chamberlain made no
mention of § 1201(f), and the Federal Circuit declined to reach the
issue.128 Because the court was satisfied that Chamberlain could not
prove a prima facie violation of § 1201, the failure to delve into an
affirmative defense provides little cause for criticism.129
123
Storage Tech. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g, 421 F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed. Cir.
2005). Section 117 of the Copyright Act provides an exception to infringement
liability for the creation of copies of computer programs for the purposes of
maintenance and repair of computer equipment. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2006).
124
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1201.
125
Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 551 (Merritt, J., concurring).
126
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1193.
127
See Brief of Computer & Communications Industry Ass’n as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Skylink Technologies, Inc., Chamberlain, 381 F.3d 1178 (No. 04-1118);
Brief of Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Static Control
Components, Inc., Lexmark, 387 F.3d 522 (No. 0305400).
128
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1201 n.15.
129
The court continued this silence on § 1201(f) in Storage Technology Corp. v.
Custom Hardware Engineering & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
There, the district court held that because the defendant infringed plaintiff’s copyright,
§ 1201(f) did not apply. Storage Technology Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g &
Consulting, Inc., No. 02-12102, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12391, at *15 (D. Mass. July 2,
2004). Although it reversed the infringement holding, the Federal Circuit saw no
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Lexmark offered some clarification of the independent creation
requirement of § 1201(f), even if only in dicta. The Sixth Circuit
explained that independent creation only requires proof of originality;
the new program must not infringe the protected program.130 The
district court’s findings that SCC’s program “serve[d] no legitimate
purpose other than to circumvent Lexmark’s authentication sequence”
and contained copies of unprotected Lexmark code were insufficient
to undermine SCC’s defense.131 In the end, however, Lexmark offered
no definitive holding on § 1201(f), concluding only that SCC “may
benefit from the interoperability defense, at least in the preliminary
injunction context.”132
Although both courts were reluctant to reach the issue, the facts in
Lexmark and Chamberlain presented fairly straightforward applications
of § 1201(f). SCC and Skylink both sought to circumvent TPMs that
restricted access to computer programs, clearing the hurdle that
proved decisive in Reimerdes. Likewise, both defendants wrote
interoperable programs that contained original code sufficient to
qualify as independently created. Lastly, neither their acts of reverse
engineering nor the distribution of the resulting tools constituted
copyright infringement.
Perhaps most importantly, Lexmark and Chamberlain offered an
opportunity to clarify the demands of the sole purpose requirement.133
Certainly, both SCC and Skylink were motivated by a desire to render
their products interoperable with systems restricted by TPMs. But this
motive was in no strict sense their sole purpose. Interoperability was
not their ultimate aim, but an instrumental goal. The sale of ancillary
products and the undermining of their rivals’ market positions are just
two examples of the many purposes from which the desire to
interoperate could flow. Rather than focus on higher order goals that a
court may find suspect, the analysis of § 1201(f) should rely on a
functional investigation of the circumventor’s objective that looks to the
manner in which the information obtained was used. This is precisely
need to revisit the interoperability question.
130
Likewise, because the Toner Loading Program was not protected, its copying
did not constitute infringement under § 1201(f)(3). Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 551. The
court rejected two other limitations on § 1201(f) proposed by Lexmark: (1) any
independently created programs “must have existed prior to” the acts of reverse
engineering; and (2) any technological means developed to circumvent must be
“necessary or absolutely needed” to achieve interoperability. Id. at 550-51.
131
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943,
974 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
132
Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 550.
133
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1) (2006).
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the sort of inquiry the Ninth Circuit undertook in Sega, the case
Congress expressly intended § 1201(f) to preserve. Under such an
analysis, § 1201(f)’s permitted purpose — identifying and analyzing
program elements necessary for interoperability — can be contrasted
with the desire to distribute copies of protected works or to identify
elements necessary for the development of noninteroperable programs.
Circumventors who make such uses lack the requisite sole purpose.
No evidence suggests that SCC hoped to develop its own program to
control the internal operation of printers manufactured by Lexmark or
any of its competitors. Nor did Skylink circumvent Chamberlain’s
rolling code to copy its GDO firmware or create a competing GDO. In
both instances, regardless of the downstream motivation of the
defendants, the sole functional purpose of their reverse engineering
was to obtain interoperability information.
Lexmark and Chamberlain, much like Connectix and Bleem, represent
missed opportunities for courts to counterbalance the
misinterpretation of § 1201(f) offered in Reimerdes. Lexmark and
Chamberlain both articulated meaningful outer boundaries on the
scope of § 1201. However, they may have more effectively curbed
further efforts to restrict interoperability had they squarely addressed
§ 1201(f). As discussed below, the absence of clear authority applying
§ 1201(f) has given rise to subsequent DMCA case law that threatens
interoperability despite the limits imposed by Lexmark and
Chamberlain.
D. The Continuing Threat to Interoperability
Commentators have rightly praised Lexmark and Chamberlain for
resisting the expansive interpretation of the DMCA embodied in
Reimerdes,134 but neither opinion has proven a panacea for the DMCA’s
restriction of interoperability. Plaintiffs have continued to view the
DMCA as a tool to reduce competition from interoperable products,
and § 1201(f) has become mired in even deeper judicial
misinterpretation. However, the inadequacy of anticircumvention’s
interoperability policy cannot be placed entirely at the feet of the
courts; some blame rests with the narrow text of § 1201(f).

134
See, e.g., Burk, supra note 68, at 571 (“The Chamberlain and Lexmark opinions
radically change the trend begun in Reimerdes . . . .”); Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room
for Consumers Under the DMCA, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1119, 1132-34 (2007) (noting
approvingly explicit recognition of consumer interests in Chamberlain).
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Durable Goods Revisited

In the wake of Lexmark and Chamberlain, mobile phones emerged as
the next consumer product subject to specious anticircumvention
claims. Just like printers sold cheap in the hope of profits from
expensive ink, mobile phones are often subsidized by service charges
recouped over the life of the phone.135 As a result, providers have
strong incentives to limit the availability of interoperable services.
Mobile phones contain various programs that enable their many
functions, including firmware that controls the ability to connect to a
cellular network. Carriers typically configure phones to connect only
to their own network136 and rely on a variety of TPMs to prevent users
from accessing and reconfiguring firmware to allow connections to
competing networks.137 Not surprisingly, consumers have been eager
to overcome these restrictions on the use of interoperable networks,
and third-party vendors have assisted them. Through a process
known as unlocking, consumers and vendors bypass these TPMs to
enable connections to other networks. In some instances, unlocking
involves the input of reverse-engineered numeric codes.138 In other
cases, end users unlock their phones by deleting both the firmware
and the associated TPM, then installing new firmware that enables
connectivity.139
TracFone is a vendor of prepaid mobile phones, which it sells at a
loss.140 Once the prepaid minutes included with each phone expire,
customers can purchase additional minutes from TracFone. To
prevent customers from obtaining cheaper service elsewhere,
TracFone relies on TPMs that prevent connections to competing
networks.141 TracFone has filed a series of lawsuits alleging violations
of § 1201 by vendors that unlocked and resold its phones.
135

See Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT’L J. COMMS. 389, 398-99 (2007).
See COMMENTS OF THE WIRELESS ALLIANCE & ROBERT PINKERTON 4,
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/granick_wirelessalliance.pdf.
137
See id. at 7 (discussing variety of technological means used by carriers).
138
See Hearing on Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 40-41 (Mar. 23, 2006), http://
www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/hearings/transcript-mar23.pdf [hereinafter Hearings]
(testimony of Jennifer Granick and Steven Metalitz).
139
See id.
140
TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. GSM Group, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1333 (S.D.
Fla. 2008).
141
Id. at 1334. Apple too has drawn criticism for its use of technological measures
to require iPhone customers to subscribe to the AT&T network. See generally Mark
DeFeo, Unlocking the iPhone: How Antitrust Law Can Save Consumers from the
Inadequacies of Copyright Law, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1037 (2008) (noting consumer
136
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As the Register of Copyrights recognized in the 2006 DMCA
Anticircumvention Rulemaking,142 a consumer who unlocks a phone
to connect to another network is not “engaging in copyright
infringement or in activity that in any way implicates copyright
infringement or the interests of the copyright owner.”143 Because
unlocking is a noninfringing use, mobile phone firmware was included
in a temporary exemption from the circumvention ban so long as
unlocking occurs for the sole purpose of lawfully connecting to a
wireless network.144
Nonetheless, this exemption has not deterred TracFone from
continuing its aggressive pursuit of those who unlock its handsets.
Indeed, TracFone has prevailed in a string of recent § 1201 cases, only
one of which even considered the mobile phone exemption.145 In that
case, the court denied a motion to dismiss notwithstanding the
exemption because the complaint alleged that the defendants’ purpose
was not solely wireless network connectivity, but also reselling
unlocked phones.146
The court’s unreasonably rigid analysis of the exemption’s sole
purpose requirement falls into the same trap discussed above in
connection with § 1201(f). That requirement does not ask courts to
peer into the ultimate aim or purpose for which lawful connection to a
wireless network is sought. Its drafters intended that language to
exclude circumvention by those seeking access to ringtones, video
content, and other copyrighted works stored on mobile phones.147
opposition to Apple’s exclusive arrangement with AT&T and evaluating potential
antitrust challenges).
142
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006) (empowering Librarian of Congress to
exempt, on a temporary basis, classes of copyrighted works from anticircumvention
ban to extent it interferes with noninfringing use of those works).
143
RECOMMENDATION OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 50 (Nov. 17, 2006), http://
www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/1201_recommendation.pdf [hereinafter RECOMMENDATION].
144
Id. at 50-51.
145
See GSM Group, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1337 (rejecting defense premised on
unlocking exemption on basis of allegations that defendant’s sole purpose was not
lawful connection to telephone network); TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Bitcell Corp., No.
07-22249, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41955, at *9 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 2008) (entering
consent judgment and permanent injunction); TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Dixon, 475
F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (granting unopposed permanent injunction
on basis of both circumvention and trafficking claims); TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Sol
Wireless, No. 05-23279, at 3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.stopcellphonefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/1-tracfone-v-sol-wirelessgroup-inc-et-al.pdf (entering stipulated final judgment enjoining unlocking).
146
GSM Group, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.
147
See Hearings, supra note 138, at 44-46 (testimony of Steven Metalitz).
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Although the mobile phone exemption should have prevailed over
TracFone’s circumvention theory, the exemption offered no colorable
defense to its trafficking claim.148 So even assuming courts apply the
temporary mobile phone exemption more carefully, trafficking
allegations could persist.
TracFone’s litigation strategy suggests that Lexmark and
Chamberlain did not close the door on the use of the DMCA to
suppress interoperability, even in markets for consumer electronics
with embedded software. As the Copyright Office understood,
TracFone has no interest in protecting its copyrighted firmware from
potential infringement.149 Instead, it hopes to protect its business
model and pricing scheme from competitive forces by preventing
consumers from connecting to interoperable networks. TracFone’s
success has been largely unopposed, with the courts lending their
imprimatur to private settlement agreements. It remains far from clear
whether TracFone’s § 1201 theory will hold up to genuine scrutiny.
To the extent TracFone alleges that unlockers delete firmware and
the TPM that protects it, § 1201 appears altogether inapposite. Read
literally, the DMCA might prohibit the removal of a TPM regardless of
whether or not such removal enables access to the underlying work.150
But where the protected code is neither run nor accessed, but simply
deleted along with the TPM, none of the interests Congress intended
to recognize in § 1201 are implicated. Copyright does not protect
against the deletion of computer programs, and the DMCA should not
be read to confer new power over the removal of programs from
lawfully acquired hardware.
If instead, unlockers bypass protection measures to gain
unauthorized access to firmware, the threshold requirements of §
1201 could be met.
Under appropriate facts, Lexmark and
Chamberlain may limit liability.151 But TracFone’s success suggests
148
Although the Copyright Office can exempt certain works from the ban on
circumvention, its rulemaking authority does not extend to the prohibition on
trafficking in circumvention devices or services. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(E) (2006).
See generally Aaron Perzanowski, Evolving Standards and the Future of the DMCA
Anticircumvention Rulemaking, 10 J. INTERNET L. 1 (2007) (detailing limitations on
scope of Copyright Office’s rulemaking authority).
149
See RECOMMENDATION, supra note 143, at 50.
150
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (including “remov[al]” of TPM among acts
considered circumvention).
151
Chamberlain relied in part on customers’ “inherent legal right to use” their
garage door openers, a right unrestricted by any contractual obligations. Chamberlain,
381 F.3d 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004). But if carriers contractually restrict the ability
of customers to connect to competing networks, Chamberlain may prove inapplicable.
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that the limits those cases impose are sufficiently unclear to justify
settlement by multiple defendants, even if TracFone’s claims are
ultimately flawed on the merits.
Section 1201(f) offers unlockers another plausible defense.
Although unlocking enables interoperability with communications
networks, those networks are composed of not only base stations and
radio signals, but also software that controls network
communications.152 Therefore, the practical effect of unlocking is
interoperability between mobile phone firmware and other
independently created programs. But without applicable precedent,
courts may be reluctant to apply § 1201(f) to facts that appear, on the
surface, far from those that Congress anticipated. As discussed below,
the opinions that followed Lexmark and Chamberlain did little to
encourage courts to extend § 1201(f) to those facts or any others.
2.

Davidson: Re-Misinterpreting § 1201(f)

Just one year after Lexmark and Chamberlain, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the most extensive and deeply misguided
analysis of § 1201(f) to date. Davidson & Associates v. Jung tested the
application of the DMCA to the development of interoperable services
for the online play of copyrighted video games.153 While Reimerdes
introduced considerable uncertainty, Davidson and the district court
opinion it affirmed threaten to undermine fundamentally § 1201(f)
through their consistently hostile misinterpretation of the statute.154
Davidson involved Blizzard, the developer of several multi-player PC
games. Blizzard offered an online matchmaking service, Battle.net,
which allowed players to compete over the Internet. Battle.net relied
on a secret handshake with Blizzard games to validate unique CD
keys. If the key was invalid or in use by another player, Battle.net
denied access, preventing the use of infringing copies of Blizzard
games on the Battle.net server.155

But as the Copyright Office has confirmed, unlocking poses no threat to legitimate
copyright interests, so the nexus required by Chamberlain appears utterly lacking. See
RECOMMENDATION, supra note 143, at 50.
152
KAVEH PAHLAVAN & ALLEN H. LEVESQUE, WIRELESS INFORMATION NETWORKS 10
(2005) (noting role of base stations, radio signals and antennae, and software
programs in cellular networks).
153
422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
154
See id. at 640-42; Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d
1164, 1183-85 (E.D. Mo. 2004), aff’d sub nom., 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
155
Davidson, 422 F.3d at 633 nn.2-3.
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A group of Blizzard enthusiasts, frustrated with certain shortcomings
of Battle.net, developed an alternative matchmaking service, dubbed
bnetd, that interoperated with Blizzard games.156 The bnetd project
reverse engineered the protocols used by Blizzard games to
communicate with Battle.net and developed a functionally equivalent
server and software that allowed players to connect to it.157 But because
bnetd lacked access to Blizzard’s database of CD keys, it was unable to
ensure that all players used legitimate copies of Blizzard games.158
Blizzard sued the bnetd team, alleging violations of the
circumvention and trafficking bans of § 1201. Blizzard argued that the
secret handshake controlled access to “Battle.net mode,” the ability to
play Blizzard games online.159 Bnetd raised § 1201(f) as a defense,
arguing that any circumvention of Blizzard’s access controls simply
enabled reverse engineering necessary to render the bnetd server
software interoperable with Blizzard games.
Any tools bnetd
distributed that facilitated circumvention, it maintained, were likewise
intended to enable interoperability.160
The district court rejected bnetd’s § 1201(f) defense for several
reasons. First, the court claimed that bnetd could not rely on §
1201(f) because it lacked permission to circumvent. The district court
appeared to confuse the basic elements of a § 1201 violation with the
requirements of the interoperability defense, stating that “[t]he
statute . . . only exempts those who obtained permission to circumvent
the technological measure.”161 Of course, if bnetd had permission, an
affirmative defense would be unnecessary.
Second, the court found that the sole purpose of bnetd’s
circumvention was not to enable interoperability, but “to avoid the
anticircumvention restrictions of the game and to avoid the restricted

156
These complaints included frequent unreliability and widespread cheating. Id.
at 635 n.6.
157
Id. at 636.
158
Id.
159
Premising DMCA liability on access to “Battle.net mode” was problematic.
Neither the district court nor the Eighth Circuit settled on any one description of
Battle.net mode, suggesting at various turns that it was a component of the game code,
a part of the Battle.net server, and something in between. See A.H. Rajani, Note,
Davidson & Associates v. Jung: (Re)interpreting Access Controls, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.
J. 365, 377-78 (2006). But users of bnetd gained no access to the Battle.net server and
already had access to the contents of their unencrypted Blizzard game discs.
160
Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1183 (E.D. Mo.
2004), aff’d sub nom., 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
161
Id. at 1185 (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444 (2d
Cir. 2001)).
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access to Battle.net.”162 If the court meant that bnetd’s purpose for
circumvention was to circumvent, it is correct. But this tautology does
little to resolve the question of the purpose of bnetd’s circumvention.
The court offered four reasons to suspect bnetd’s motives: (1) the
bnetd server did not verify users’ CD keys; (2) the bnetd software was
distributed for free; (3) bnetd distributed its software in binary form;
and (4) the bnetd server source code was made available.163 Again,
rather than probing bnetd’s motives for achieving interoperability, the
court should have confined its inquiry to the functional purpose of the
acts of reverse engineering made possible by circumvention. Bnetd
did not circumvent in hopes of copying Blizzard’s protected expression
or creating an infringing game. The bnetd developers used the
information they sought solely to create a program that interoperated
with Blizzard’s games. Whether bnetd distributed the resulting
program for free or for profit, with closed or open source, is of little
consequence.
Only the first of the court’s reasons points to any plausible basis to
doubt bnetd’s purpose.164 If bnetd created a tool that achieved
interoperability but disregarded Blizzard’s efforts to suppress the use
of infringing copies of its games, perhaps bnetd’s purpose embraced
not only interoperability but the encouragement of infringement as
well. The evidence, however, suggests that any inference drawn
against bnetd, even on this ground, was unjustified. The bnetd
developers requested access to Blizzard’s CD key database to enable
screening for infringing copies, a request Blizzard denied.165 Blizzard,
of course, had no obligation to comply, but bnetd’s request is entirely
consistent with a lawful purpose to enable interoperability.
Third, the court rejected bnted’s § 1201(f) defense on the grounds
that the bnetd server was not an independently created computer
program because it was “intended as a functional alternative to the
Battle.net service,” one that was indistinguishable from Battle.net from
the standpoint of users.166 But this functional equivalence simply
suggests that bnetd was successful in its attempt to enable
interoperability. By counting this fact against bnetd, the court
162

Id. at 1186.
Id. at 1185.
164
Denying protection under § 1201(f) because bnetd distributed its software for
free is particularly inappropriate. The court could just as easily have imputed impure
motives to bnetd for profiting from its interoperable software.
165
See Letter from Cindy A. Cohn to Rod Rigole (Mar. 11, 2002),
http://www.eff.org/pages/eff-letter-blizzard-vivendi.
166
Davidson, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
163

1588

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 42:1549

betrayed a deep misunderstanding of the activities § 1201(f) was
meant to privilege. Moreover, the court ignored clear congressional
intent. Independent creation requires only that “[t]he resulting
product . . . be a new and original work, in that it may not infringe the
original computer program.”167 As the court should have understood,
the fact that the two servers were functionally interchangeable did not
establish infringement.
This failure to analyze any supposed infringement was central in the
court’s fourth reason for rejecting bnetd’s defense. According to the
court, “the development and distribution to others [of the bnetd
software] constituted copyright infringement,” violating the final
requirement of § 1201(f).168 But the court articulated no theory, much
less an analysis, of copyright infringement. The bnetd software,
although functionally equivalent to the Battle.net server, does not
appear to have copied any of its code. Nor does the record support a
finding of infringement based on copying of any Blizzard games.
Without any infringement analysis, the court’s conclusion, that bnetd
could not avail itself of the § 1201(f) defense as a result of its
supposed acts of infringement, is entirely unfounded.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit failed to improve upon the district
court’s mangled reading of § 1201(f). Instead, it introduced further
confusion. The court rejected bnetd’s defense on the grounds that its
circumvention constituted infringement because unauthorized copies
of Blizzard games could be played on the bnetd server.169 As an initial
matter, the court was wrong to ask whether the circumvention was an
act of infringement. The relevant question is whether the acts of
identification and analysis enabled by circumvention, or the
subsequent sharing of information and tools that enable
circumvention, were acts of infringement. Here the Eighth Circuit
may have confused § 1201(f)’s reference to “infringement” — the
unauthorized exercise of the exclusive rights defined in § 106 of the
Copyright Act — with a violation of § 1201.
However, if
“infringement” referred to § 1201 violations, qualifying for the
interoperability defense would be a logical impossibility because acts
of infringement are a bar to a § 1201(f) defense.
These flaws aside, the fact that some users connected to the bnetd
server using unauthorized copies of Blizzard games does not prove
that bnetd infringed Blizzard’s copyrights. Unless bnetd’s reverse

167
168
169

S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 32 (1998).
Davidson, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1187.
Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 642 (8th Cir. 2005).
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engineering entailed unfair copying or its software tools contained
infringing expression, the court lacked any justification for its
conclusory finding of infringement. The Eighth Circuit’s opinion
simply contains no analysis to support its pronouncement of
infringement.
The district court’s struggle in Davidson to make sense of the basic
elements of § 1201(f), coupled with the Eighth Circuit’s disinterest in
an independent analysis, leave developers of interoperable
technologies in an unenviable position. Aside from the Sixth Circuit’s
nonbinding receptiveness to § 1201(f) in Lexmark, defendants can
point to no favorable interpretations of the defense. As a result, even
defendants who fall squarely within the protections for reverse
engineering and interoperability created by Congress face considerable
uncertainty. Judicial misinterpretation, however, explains only part of
the failure of § 1201(f). Congress’s choice to limit the exemption’s
scope to computer programs ensures that the statute cannot insulate
all interoperable technologies from liability.
3.

The Shortcomings of § 1201(f)

The text of § 1201(f) reflects the legislative compromise responsible
for its enactment. The exemption tempered the nearly unlimited
anticircumvention provisions favored by the entertainment industry,
but gave advocates of reverse engineering and interoperability fewer
safeguards than they might have preferred. Reverse engineers who
extract uncopyrightable processes and principles to create
noninteroperable products are not privileged under § 1201(f).170 Nor
are researchers who investigate the operation of TPMs, their
effectiveness, and their implications for security and privacy.171
170
See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 43 (1998) (“If a person makes this
information available for a purpose other than to achieve interoperability . . . then
such action is a violation of this Act.”).
171
Sections 1201(g) and (j), the encryption research and security testing
exemptions, offer researchers some protection under narrowly defined circumstances.
For a discussion of the impact of § 1201(g) on encryption research, see generally
Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 501 (2003) (arguing that academic encryption research should be allowed under
DMCA). Even outside of the encryption context, TPM research can offer significant
benefits to the public. As the Sony BMG rootkit incident made clear, TPMs can cause
serious security and privacy threats best discovered and exposed by independent
researchers. See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Magnificence of the
Disaster: Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157,
1232 (2007). More recently, DRM employed on PC video games has given rise to
similar concerns. See Comment of J. Alex Halderman, In the Matter of Exemption to
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Aside from its failure to accommodate reverse engineering for other
legitimate purposes, § 1201(f) does not embrace all interoperable
technologies.
Section 1201(f) permits the circumvention of
technological measures that protect computer programs, but not
“works generally, such as music or audiovisual works . . . distributed
in digital form.”172 As a result, interoperable products that make use
of technologically protected entertainment content or other works are
open to attack under the DMCA.
The disparity in the treatment of these two classes of interoperable
technologies is the result of two problematic distinctions. First, this
inequality relies on a clear division between technological measures
that protect computer programs and those that protect other
copyrighted works. Second, it relies on a distinction between program
interoperability and data interoperability. Both distinctions are the
product of factual oversimplifications, and neither supports exempting
one class of interoperable technologies while subjecting the other to
DMCA liability.
TPMs cannot be neatly divided between those that restrict the use of
entertainment content and those that control the use of computer
programs. Frequently, the same TPM serves both functions. An early
§ 1201 dispute, RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., illustrates the
difficulty in drawing such distinctions. RealNetworks (“Real”)
developed technology for streaming audio and video files encoded in
its RealMedia formats. Real used a “secret handshake” between its
RealServer and RealPlayer client to ensure that third-party applications
could not stream RealMedia files. If an application requesting a file
from RealServer did not execute the handshake, access was denied.173
Real obtained a preliminary injunction against Streambox,
developers of the VCR, an application that mimicked the secret
handshake to interoperate with RealServer. The court found that the
handshake served as an effective access control, one the VCR
circumvented by mimicking RealPlayer.174 The key question the
RealPlayer presented, however, was not whether the handshake
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control
Technologies, Docket No. RM 20088, at 5-6, http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2008/
comments/halderman-reid.pdf (describing risks associated with Macrovision’s
SafeDisc and Sony’s SecuROM technologies).
172
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 33; see also Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note
35, at 1635 n.289 (noting that § 1201(f) does not extend to program-to-data
interoperability).
173
RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1889, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
174
Id. at *19-20.
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restricted access, but rather, to what copyrighted works it restricted
access. Although the court correctly found that the handshake
restricted access to RealMedia files, it also restricted access to the
RealServer application. Without authentication, users were unable to
access that portion of the RealServer that enabled streaming. To
prevent access to RealMedia files, Real simultaneously limited access
to the RealServer software. To the extent that TPMs restrict access to
both entertainment content and computer programs, the clean
distinctions presupposed by the DMCA are difficult to draw.175
The Streambox litigation also illustrates the second problematic
distinction at work in § 1201(f). The StreamboxVCR ignored Real’s
“Copy Switch,” a bit of code that reflected copyright holder
preferences about end user copying. As a result, Streambox could
have faced difficulty in establishing that interoperability was its sole
purpose under § 1201(f).176 But setting aside that fact, consider a
hypothetical application that interoperated with the RealServer and
fully complied with the copy switch: one that functioned exactly like
RealPlayer and presented precisely the same risk of infringement.
Because the handshake restricted access to entertainment content, §
1201(f) would have been unavailable.
The unavailability of § 1201(f) in such circumstances ignores the
role of data in enabling interoperable relationships, hampering §
1201(f)’s ability to accommodate interoperability fully.177 While
interoperability sometimes depends on access to a computer program,
it may depend on the ability to extract interoperability information
from data created or used by that application. When access to these
inputs and outputs is restricted, interoperability suffers.
Even the definition of interoperability in § 1201(f) — “the ability of
computer programs to exchange information, and of such programs
mutually to use the information which has been exchanged” —

175
The text and legislative history of § 1201(f) are clear that the defense was meant
to apply to TPMs that restrict access to computer programs and not to those that restrict
access to digital media. The status of dual purpose TPMs — those that simultaneously
restrict access to both types of works — is ambiguous as a textual matter. However, the
DMCA’s definitional focus on program-to-program interoperability strongly suggests
that circumvention that aims to enable interoperability between a program and data or
media would not be privileged under § 1201(f).
176
Unlike in Davidson, no evidence suggests that Streambox made any effort to
comply with the copy switch.
177
See URS GASSER & JOHN PALFREY, DRM-PROTECTED MUSIC INTEROPERABILITY AND
EINNOVATION 21 (2007), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.
harvard.edu/files/interop-drm-music_0.pdf.
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reflects an undue focus on program-level interoperability.178 Under
Congress’s definition, computer programs exhaust the class of
potentially interoperable objects. Had Congress embraced a broader
system-level view of interoperability, rather than drawing a bright line
between programs and data, it may have recognized that both
programs and data are system components capable of enabling
interoperability.
Congress’s focus on program-level interoperability has two related
explanations. First, the content industry, concerned that broad
exemptions would undo § 1201’s prohibitions, opposed the adoption
or expansion of proposed exemptions.179 Second, the software
industry, the primary proponent of § 1201(f), had finite influence.
The software industry focused its efforts on maintaining the ability to
access other programs for reverse engineering, a practice central to
prevailing industry practices. Data interoperability presented a less
pressing concern to software developers, and by extension, Congress.
The distinction between program and data interoperability, while
explicable as a matter of legislative process, is deeply problematic.
The definition of “computer program” provided by the Copyright Act
hints, albeit unintentionally, at the difficulty of drawing inflexible
distinctions between program and data. Section 101 defines a
computer program as “a set of statements or instructions to be used
directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result.”180 Of course, the result experienced by a user of digital
content is brought about by instructions contained in both the
application and the data file.
A hard and fast distinction between program and data is particularly
inappropriate with respect to § 1201(f) for two additional reasons.
Congress explicitly intended the interoperability exemption to
preserve Sega. The Sega court permitted the reverse engineering of
video games — works that straddle the line between computer
programs and digital entertainment content. Further, files distributed
in TPM-restricted formats exhibit program-like characteristics. Those
files contain functional instructions distinct from the movies or music

178

17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(4) (2006).
See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 2281 Before the H. Subcomm. on Telecommunications,
Trade, and Consumer Protection, 105th Cong. 7-8 (June 5, 1998) (testimony of Steven
J. Metalitz), available at http://www.hrrc.org/File/June5-98Hearing.pdf (describing “a
host of additional amendments . . . to narrow the anti-circumvention provisions” that
were “not absolutely necessary . . . and that cut back on the rights of copyright
owners” as “not . . . especially popular with the MPAA or its member companies”).
180
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
179
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they encode. Files in TPM-restricted formats contain instructions that
control the ability of other programs or devices to interoperate.
Ultimately, the distinction between data and program
interoperability cannot justify the stark differences that distinction
creates in the scope of DMCA protection. As a more recent dispute
makes clear, the narrow language of § 1201(f) furnishes providers of
TPM-restricted content unprecedented control over playback
technologies.
Several years after its litigation against Streambox, RealNetworks
was at the center of another interoperability controversy, this time as
the alleged circumventor. Apple’s iPod is the world’s most popular
portable music player, and its iTunes store is the top music retailer in
the United States.181 The only digital rights management (“DRM”)
technology supported by the iPod is Apple’s FairPlay.
Real’s
competing download service utilized its own Helix DRM technology.
Thus, music purchased from Real could not be played back on the
iPod.182 Given the iPod’s popularity, Real’s customers demanded
compatibility.
Real proposed a tactical alliance, under which Apple would license
Real’s use of FairPlay, and Real would promote the iPod to its
customers.183 Apple declined.184 Months later, determined to enable
iPod interoperability, Real announced a technology called Harmony
that converted Real’s Helix-protected files into a format that
successfully mimicked FairPlay.185 Real touted Harmony as a boon for
“[c]ompatibility, choice and quality” that “follow[ed] in a wellestablished tradition of fully legal, independently developed”
interoperable technologies.186 Apple responded by accusing Real of
“adopt[ing] the tactics and ethics of a hacker to break into the

181
See Eric Bangeman, Apple Passes Wal-mart, Now #1 Music Retailer in US, ARS
TECHNICA, Apr. 2, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080402-apple-passeswal-mart-now-1-music-retailer-in-us.html; Arik Hesseldahl, A Real Rival for Apple’s
iPod?, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 19, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/
content/sep2006/tc20060918_036885.htm.
182
See John Borland, RealNetworks Breaks Apple’s Hold on iPod, CNET, July 26,
2004, http://news.cnet.com/RealNetworks-breaks-Apples-hold-on-iPod/2100-1027_35282063.html.
183
See Geoff Duncan, Apple Refuses to Sing with Real’s Harmony, TidBITS, Aug. 2,
2004, http://db.tidbits.com/article/7756.
184
See id.
185
Press Release, RealNetworks Statement About Harmony Technology and
Creating Consumer Choice (July 29, 2004), http://realnetworks.com/company/press/
releases/2004/harmony_statement.html.
186
Id.
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iPod.”187 Apple then threatened both legal action under the DMCA
and technological self-help to disrupt Harmony.188
Ultimately, Apple relied on the latter option. A few months after the
release of Harmony, Apple updated its iTunes software to block the
use of converted Real files.189 Nonetheless, Real eventually achieved
iPod interoperability. It did so not by reverse engineering or licensing
FairPlay, but by selling mp3 files unencumbered by DRM and
compatible with all portable players, including the iPod.190
Because Apple did not file suit against Real, it never clearly
articulated its DMCA theory. Harmony enabled Real customers to
access music protected with its own Helix DRM on the iPod; it did not
enable them to access music purchased from iTunes and protected
with FairPlay. Thus, an argument that Real trafficked in a tool that
enabled unauthorized access to iTunes content was a non-starter.
However, Apple may have contended that FairPlay restricted access
not to iTunes music, but to the iPod’s embedded software. In the
ordinary course of operation, iPod users could access the playback
software on their iPod only if they loaded unencrypted or FairPlayprotected files on the device. By mimicking FairPlay, Apple could
have argued, Harmony enabled unauthorized access to software
embedded on the iPod.
Although the connection to potential infringement is arguably more
substantial than in Chamberlain, a court so inclined could have rejected
Apple’s claim based on the Federal Circuit’s nexus requirement. The act
of accessing the iPod’s software to play lawfully purchased content
creates little, if any, risk of infringement. Likewise, a court could have
held that users were authorized to access the iPod’s software by virtue of
purchasing the device. More importantly, to the extent that Apple
characterized its DRM as restricting access to the iPod software, it
opened the door to a § 1201(f) defense, a defense Real stressed in its
response to Apple’s threats. In short, a DMCA theory premised on
unauthorized access to the iPod faced substantial difficulties.
Apple’s more plausible claim would have alleged that Real’s reverse
engineering during the creation of Harmony circumvented FairPlay,

187
Apple Statement (July 29, 2004), http://prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?
ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/07-29-2004/0002221065.
188
Id.
189
See John Borland, Apple Fights RealNetworks’ ‘Hacker Tactics’, CNET, Dec. 14,
2004, http://news.cnet.com/2102-1027_3-5490604.html.
190
See Arnold Kim, Rhapsody Relaunches with iPod-Compatible MP3s, MACRUMORS,
June 30, 2008, http://www.macrumors.com/2008/06/30/rhapsody-relaunches-withipod-compatible-mp3s.
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resulting in unauthorized access to iTunes music.
If such
circumvention occurred,191 a § 1201(f) defense would face major
challenges. Although Real’s reverse engineering was intended to enable
interoperability between its system and the iPod, the protections of §
1201(f) would be unavailable under the prevailing reading because
FairPlay restricted access to entertainment content, not iPod software.192
Likewise, Lexmark would have been of limited value to Real. FairPlay,
unlike the TPM at issue in Lexmark, utilized encryption to control
effectively access to the underlying copyrighted material.
The Chamberlain framework represented Real’s strongest potential
defense. To the extent Real circumvented FairPlay solely for reverse
engineering purposes, an act squarely within the fair use privilege
under Sega, any nexus between circumvention and infringement
would appear to be lacking. But a number of considerations suggest
that the success of such a defense would have been far from certain.
First, although the Federal Circuit has relied on statutory defenses —
namely the maintenance and repair provisions of § 117193 — to
disconfirm the required nexus, it has not explicitly held that the
notoriously context-dependent fair use defense would apply with
equal force. Second, while at least one district court has followed the
Federal Circuit’s Chamberlain framework, no other Courts of Appeals
have yet adopted Chamberlain.194 Third, Chamberlain’s hostility to the
191

Real claimed it developed Harmony using only publicly available information,
suggesting that circumvention was unnecessary. Indeed, Real may have created
Harmony by reverse engineering existing FairPlay circumvention tools. See Posting of
Ernest Miller to Corante, http://importance.corante.com/archives/005301.php (July
26, 2004, 17:52 EST).
192
The hurdles facing a § 1201(f) defense in the context of digital media
interoperability can be contrasted with the greater likelihood of success of that same
defense in the context of iPhone application interoperability. Apple tightly controls
the applications authorized for use on the iPhone. Low-level cryptographic checks
ensure that the iPhone operating system has not been altered and that all installed
applications have been approved. Developers unable or unwilling to obtain Apple’s
approval for their applications, as well as the users of such applications, must rely on
“jailbreaking” — the process of reconfiguring the iPhone to run unapproved code.
Apple maintains that this activity violates § 1201. See Responsive Comment of Apple
Inc., In the Matter of Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright
Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, Docket No. RM 2008-8, at 26,
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2008/responses/apple-inc-31.pdf. But because the
TPMs at issue are designed to restrict access to computer programs, the threshold
requirement of § 1201(f) is satisfied. Although the other elements of the defense,
most importantly the sole purpose requirement, must also be met, jailbreakers enjoy a
reasonable likelihood of success under § 1201(f).
193
See supra note 123.
194
See Agfa Monotype Corp. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1034 (N.D.
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DMCA claims at issue stem in part from the incongruity of using a
statute enacted to protect digital media content to gain exclusivity
over household appliances. Because the digital music protected by
FairPlay is much nearer to the core concerns Congress intended to
address with the DMCA, courts may have been reluctant to apply
Chamberlain in this context.
Section 1201(f), the DMCA’s primary legislative safeguard for
interoperability, has proven inadequate.
The Chamberlain and
Lexmark decisions, while placing important limits on the scope of
DMCA protection, offer developers of interoperable technologies
insufficient assurance in the digital media context. In response,
developers and advocates of interoperable technologies have turned to
other legal frameworks to resist the restrictions on interoperability
enabled by the DMCA. Not surprisingly, given the potential
competitive implications of the DMCA, antitrust has emerged as the
preferred means of externally restraining the power afforded by § 1201
over interoperable technologies. The next Part examines both the
efficacy and desirability of this approach.
III. ANTITRUST & INTEROPERABILITY
Because the DMCA is ill equipped to address fully its interference
with interoperability, consumers, competitors, and regulators have
looked to antitrust law to limit the control TPMs yield over
interoperable technologies. This Part considers recent efforts to use
antitrust principles to lower the barriers facing unauthorized
interoperable products, taking the controversy surrounding Apple’s
DRM technology as a useful test case for gauging the role antitrust is
likely to play in this arena. Although antitrust remedies — notably,
mandatory disclosure of technical information — could facilitate
interoperability, antitrust law may not offer an ideal set of tools for
correcting the DMCA’s impact.
Whether their activities are
characterized as tying, denial of essential facilities, or refusal to deal,
firms that rely on TPMs to impede interoperability appear unlikely to
face consistent antitrust enforcement efforts. Given the deference
antitrust law typically affords to the lawful exercise of legitimately
acquired IP rights,195 antitrust appears unlikely to disturb the
enforcement of the broad grants provided by the DMCA.
Ill. 2005) (adopting Chamberlain framework).
195
Reliance on antitrust to enable interoperability has practical implications as
well. To the extent that it is less subject to capture than the IP legislative process,
antitrust may be well suited to balance the value of creative incentives against the
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A. Mandating Disclosure
The mandatory disclosure of interoperability information is not an
uncommon antitrust remedy. U.S. antitrust authorities, and their
European counterparts, have required parties to license or disclose
information to enable the development of competing and interoperable
products.196 The cases against Microsoft in the U.S. and Europe provide
recent examples of mandatory disclosures of interoperability
information. In its settlement with the United States, Microsoft agreed
to disclose communications protocols and application programming
interfaces.197 In Europe, Microsoft was required to disclose protocol
specifications that enabled interoperability between Windows and work
group server operating systems.198
value of a robust public domain. See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Innovation and the
Domain of Competition Policy, 60 ALA. L. REV. 103, 117 (2008). In addition, antitrust
allows for forward-looking remedies that may guard against technological efforts to
disrupt interoperability. On the other hand, these ongoing remedial structures could
pose administrability problems for courts. See Verizon Commc’ns v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004); see also Phillip Areeda, Essential
Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 853 (1989)
(arguing that “when compulsory access requires the court to assume the day-to-day
controls characteristic of a regulatory agency,” no antitrust remedy should be
available). Speed is the most important practical downside of relying on antitrust to
promote interoperability. An IP regime that favors reverse engineering would afford
developers immediate self-help, whereas years may pass before an antitrust remedy
could be put in place. See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and IP Policy, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 534, 551-52 (2003) (arguing that speed of reverse engineering selfhelp renders it preferable to antitrust conduct remedy).
196
See, e.g., Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1291 (N.D. Ala.
1998) (granting preliminary injunction requiring disclosure of technical information),
vacated on other grounds, 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc., No. 951-0064, 1995 FTC LEXIS 159, at *18-19 (Federal Trade
Commission, June 13, 1995) (requiring respondent to port computer games optimized
for computing platforms, and requiring publication of APIs for interoperability
purposes); In re Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364, 373-80 (1975) (requiring licensing of
patents and disclosure of related know-how). As part of a 1984 undertaking with the
European Commission, IBM agreed to disclose interface information to enable
hardware and software interoperability. See F.M. Scherer, Microsoft and IBM in
Europe, 84 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 65 (Jan. 23, 2003).
197
United States v. Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 67 (D.D.C. 2000) (requiring
disclosure of “APIs, Communications Interfaces and Technical Information” used to
enabled interoperability); see also United States v. Microsoft, No. 98-1232, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 76862, at *10-11 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2007) (Modified Final Judgment);
United States v. Microsoft, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 186-95 (D.D.C. 2002) (approving
settlement agreement containing provisions for mandatory disclosure of
interoperability information).
198
Commission Decision, COMP/C-3/37.792, Art. 5(a) (Mar. 24, 2004); Case T201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2004 E.C.R. 249.
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Recently, Apple emerged as the new preferred target of antitrust and
competition scrutiny. In 2004, around the time Real released
Harmony, French download service Virgin Mega filed a complaint
under European competition law alleging that Apple abused its
dominant position by refusing to license FairPlay.199 Virgin sought
mandatory disclosure of the FairPlay system in exchange for a
reasonable royalty.
According to Virgin, Apple leveraged its
dominance in the market for portable players into the music download
market by precluding interoperability by other download services,
denying competitors allegedly indispensable access to the iPod. The
French Competition Authority (“FCA”) rejected Virgin’s argument,
noting that the market for portable players was competitive and that
only a small percentage of downloaded music was transferred to such
devices.200 Perhaps more importantly, the FCA pointed out that
customers could easily convert TPM-restricted files purchased from
Virgin to an iPod-compatible format by burning them to CD, and then
importing those CDs using iTunes.201
Because existing competition law did not prohibit Apple’s refusal to
share its FairPlay technology, the French Parliament pursued a
legislative effort to ensure iPod interoperability. In 2006, France
enacted the loi relative au Driot d’Auteur et aux Droits Voisins dans la
Societe de l’Information (“Dadvsi”) to implement the European
Copyright Directive and, by extension, the WIPO Copyright Treaty.202
Although Dadvsi created DMCA-like prohibitions against the
circumvention of effective TPMs, it also required TPM providers to
disclose information, including technical documentation and program
interfaces, to developers of interoperable products.203 Dadvsi also
199
For a detailed discussion, see generally Giuseppe Mazziotti, Did Apple’s Refusal
to License Proprietary Information Enabling Interoperability with its iPod Music Player
Constitute an Abuse Under Article 82 of the EC Treaty?, BERKELEY CTR. FOR LAW & TECH.
2005, http://works.bepress.com/mazziotti/1 (discussing 2004 French Competition
Authority decision regarding Apple’s refusal to license proprietary technology and
risks of compulsory licensing to incentive model of IP rights).
200
See Conseil de la Concurrence, Decision No. 04-D-54, at 17-18 (Nov. 9, 2004),
available at http://www.conseil-concurrence.fr/pdf/avis/04d54.pdf.
201
Id. at 14.
202
Law No. 2006-961 of Aug. 1, 2006, available at http://droit.org/jo/
20060803/MCCX0300082L.html [hereinafter Dadvsi] (Law on Copyright and
Neighboring Rights in the Information Society). For a discussion of the debate
leading to the enactment of Dadvsi, see generally Deana Sobel, Note, A Bite out of
Apple? iTunes, Interoperability, and France’s Dadvsi Law, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 267
(2007) (discussing Dadvsi, its attempt to reconcile IP rights with consumer rights, and
government regulation of interoperability).
203
Code de la Propriete Intellectuelle, Article L. 331-5 and 331-7, available at
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created the Regulatory Authority for Technical Measures to hear
disputes over TPM interoperability, thus bypassing the FCA, which
had endorsed Apple’s DRM strategy.204
Apple dubbed the interoperability provisions of Dadvsi “state
sponsored piracy.”205 But France was not alone in its efforts to
increase interoperability between iPods and competing music services.
The Dutch Consumer Ombudsman filed a complaint with competition
authorities.206 And the Norwegian Ombudsman found that iTunes
imposed unreasonable terms and conditions on users, in part because
of the absence of interoperability with other offerings.207 Denmark,
Finland, Germany, and Sweden also threatened action over Apple’s
restriction of interoperability.208
In the U.S., antitrust authorities have proven more sanguine about
Apple’s DRM strategy. At the height of European scrutiny, Thomas
Barnett, Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice, expressed skepticism about the role of antitrust
enforcement in promoting interoperability between Apple’s offerings
and those of its competitors.209 Although U.S. antitrust authorities
have declined to pursue enforcement actions against Apple, private
plaintiffs have not. Two pending class action complaints allege that
Apple’s refusal to license its FairPlay DRM technology and its
http://www.celog.fr/cpi/. Publication of the source code of an interoperable product is
prohibited if it would “seriously undermine the security and effectiveness” of the
TPM, creating potential difficulties for developers of open source software that
interacts with TPM-restricted content. Id.
204
See Dadvsi, supra note 202, at art. 14.
205
See Michael Geist, The Legal Limits of Government Tinkering With Technology,
Apr. 17, 2006, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/index.php?option=com_content&task=
view&id=1211.
206
See Jan Libbenga, Dutch Consumer Chief Puts Apple Through the Mill, THE
REGISTER, Jan. 25, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/25/dutch_out_of_tune_
with_apple/.
207
Letter from Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman to iTunes at 8-10 (May 30,
2006), www.forbrukerombudet.no/asset/2406/1/2406_1.pdf.
208
See Tom Braithewaite & Kevin Allison, Crunch Time for Apple’s Music Icon, FIN.
TIMES, June 13, 2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/21682106-faff-11da-b4d0-0000779e2340.
html; Forbrukerombudet, European Consumer Organisations Join Forces in Legal Dispute
over iTunes Music Store, Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.forbrukerombudet.no/
index.gan?id=11037079&subid=0. But European regulators were placated by Apple’s
decision to sell music without TPM restrictions, capable of playback on a wide variety of
portable players. See Forbrukerombudet, Interesting Signals from Apple Regarding iTunes,
Feb. 8, 2007, http://www.forbrukerombudet.no/index.gan?id=11037506.
209
See Thomas O. Barnett, Address at the George Mason University School of Law
Symposium: Interoperability Between Antitrust and IP 9-14 (Sept. 13, 2006),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/218316.pdf.
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unwillingness to support competing DRM systems constitute
anticompetitive conduct.210 As discussed below however, there are
good reasons to doubt whether antitrust provides a reliable tool for
counteracting the DMCA’s restriction of interoperability.
B. Questioning the Sufficiency of Antitrust Theories
Firms that rely on the legal enforcement of technological restrictions
to suppress interoperability face potential antitrust claims based on
three theories: tying, essential facilities, or refusal to deal. As
discussed below however, all three of these theories face significant
hurdles that call into question their ability to counteract consistently
the power over interoperability conferred by the DMCA.
Rather than analyze the potential application of these theories in the
abstract, this subpart will consider claims arising out of Apple’s
allegedly anticompetitive use of its FairPlay DRM. In many respects,
Apple is an attractive target for antitrust plaintiffs and an ideal test
case. Apple dominates the markets for both portable media players
and licensed music downloads — commanding market shares above
seventy percent in both sectors.211 Even assuming, however, that
Apple has market power, it is far from clear that its DRM strategy
violates U.S. antitrust law.
1.

Tying

A tying arrangement is “an agreement by a party to sell one product
but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or
tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product
from any other supplier.”212 A per se tying claim requires proof of a tie
between two separate products offered by a defendant with sufficient
210
Tucker v. Apple, 493 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Slattery v.
Apple, No. 05-0037, 2005 WL 2204981, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2005). The
antitrust complaints lodged against Apple have targeted a number of its business
practices, only some of which implicate the DMCA. Apple’s decision, for example, to
disable support for Microsoft’s WMA format, while potentially relevant to an antitrust
inquiry, is not an exercise of any power Apple wields as a result of the protections
afforded by the DMCA.
211
See Beleaguered Creative Reports Loss; Seeks to Boost Sales with Apple iPod
Accessories, MACDAILYNEWS, May 2, 2007, http://www.macdailynews.com/index.php/
weblog/comments/13492; Rhapsody to Challenge Apple’s iTunes with MP3 Download
Service, MAIL ONLINE, June 30, 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article1030486/Rhapsody-challenge-Apples-iTunes-MP3-download-service.html.
212
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992)
(quoting N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)).
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economic power in the tying product market to affect a substantial
volume of commerce anticompetitively in the tied market.213
Apple faces two potential tying claims: first, that it forces iPod
customers to purchase digital music from iTunes; second, that iTunes
customers are required to purchase an iPod to playback digital media.
Neither of these scenarios presents a tying arrangement in the classical
sense. Apple does not condition the sale of either product, explicitly
or implicitly, on the sale of the other. A customer who wants to buy
an iPod without ever spending a dollar at the iTunes store can do so.
Likewise, customers are free to purchase music from iTunes without
buying an iPod.
But the fact that the two products can be purchased independently
is, in itself, insufficient to overcome a tying claim.214 Tying can occur
if a customer purchases the tied product in response to some
illegitimate use of the leverage acquired through the seller’s power
over the tying product. Here, the theory goes, customers are free to
buy either half of the iPod/iTunes combination without the other, but
those who do so are denied the full value of their purchases.
Customers who buy an iPod, but refuse to use iTunes, are unable to
play licensed downloads on their device. Further, customers cannot
play music purchased from the iTunes store on a portable device that
is not an iPod. As a result, Apple “refuses to accommodate those who
prefer one without the other.”215
Both of these tying theories are factually flawed. The notion that
using the iPod to play licensed downloads requires customers to
purchase content from the iTunes store is belied by the available
alternatives. Setting aside the fact that the vast majority of music on
iPods originates from either existing CD collections or illicit
downloads, a variety of licensed download services are compatible
with the iPod. eMusic, founded in 1998, is the second largest digital
music retailer and exclusively sells DRM-free mp3 files.216 Although
eMusic’s four million-track library focuses on independent labels,217
retailers including Amazon, Real, Napster, and Walmart offer DRMfree downloads from both independent and major labels.218
213

See id. at 462.
See id.
215
Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW
§ 17.01i (3d ed. 2006).
216
See About eMusic, http://www.emusic.com/about/index.html (last visited Mar.
17, 2009).
217
See id.
218
See Kenneth Corbin, Rhapsody Bets DRM-Free Downloads Can Foil iTunes,
214
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Similarly, the claim that Apple forces iTunes customers to buy an
iPod to make use of purchased digital content overstates the case.
Customers are, of course, free to listen to purchased content using a
Windows or Mac computer. But even restricting the inquiry to use on
a portable player, iTunes customers can easily and legally convert
FairPlay-protected tracks to DRM-free mp3 files.219 Recently, in
response to European critics and customers, Apple has replaced nearly
all of the Fairplay-restricted music in the iTunes catalog with DRMfree files that consumers can play on a host of portable devices.220
The ability to play iTunes tracks on other devices not only
undermines the notion of a tie between iTunes and the iPod, but also
figures in the analysis of the essential facilities doctrine discussed below.
2.

Essential Facilities

Another line of attack against Apple’s tight control over
interoperability characterizes access to the iPod and iTunes store as
competitive necessities for rivals. A monopolist that refuses a
competitor feasible access to an essential facility that cannot be
reasonably duplicated faces liability under § 2 of the Sherman Act.221
Although the essential facilities doctrine developed out of early
Supreme Court precedent,222 the Court has recently cast doubt on its
vitality.223
Some commentators have called for the doctrine’s

INTERNETNEWS.COM, June 30, 2008, http://www.internetnews.com/ec-news/article.php/
3756246.
219
The process of burning a CD copy and then importing that CD does impose
some degree of inconvenience and may result in some discernible loss of audio
quality.
220
See Apple.com, Changes Coming to the iTunes Store (Jan. 6, 2009),
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2009/01/06itunes.html. Television programs, music
videos, and motion pictures available through iTunes, however, still rely on FairPlay,
as do iPhone applications.
221
See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir.
1991) (“[T]he essential facilities doctrine imposes liability when one firm, which
controls an essential facility, denies a second firm reasonable access to a product or
service that the second firm must obtain in order to compete with the first.”); MCI
Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1982)
(citing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)).
222
See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973); United
States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1912).
223
See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 410-11 (2004) (suggesting that Court has never recognized essential facilities
doctrine).
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abandonment,224 and even some of its supporters caution against
applying it to IP.225
Assuming the doctrine represents a distinct monopolization theory
— as most lower courts do — and that Apple has monopoly power in
the relevant markets,226 potential plaintiffs must first identify the
essential facility to which Apple controls access. Music retailers would
maintain that access to the iPod is essential for their viability, while
device manufacturers would insist that access to the iTunes store is
necessary for any competitive offering. Access to both of these
putative essential facilities is controlled, at least in part, by FairPlay. A
music retailer who wants maximum iPod interoperability can rely on
no TPM other than FairPlay. Similarly, manufacturers who want their
devices to play the entire iTunes catalog must be able to decrypt
FairPlay-protected tracks. Because Apple has refused to license
FairPlay these facilities have been off limits to its competitors.227
An “indispensable requirement” of a monopolization claim premised
on an essential facilities theory is the unavailability of access to that
facility.228 Here that element appears to be lacking. Online music
retailers — including Apple’s chief rivals — have managed to gain
access to the iPod by selling DRM-free music. Although major record
labels refused to distribute their works without TPM restrictions in the
past, they have relented, perhaps in part in response to studies
demonstrating that protected content is equally vulnerable to
widespread infringement.229 Moreover, because Apple itself sells much
of its catalog in an unrestricted format, devices other than the iPod can
play iTunes content. Likewise, to the extent Amazon, Napster, and
others offer extensive catalogs of DRM-free content at competitive
224
See Areeda, supra note 195, at 841. But see Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber
Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 3-5 (2008).
225
See Abbot B. Lipsky & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1187, 1218-19 (1999).
226
See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (holding 87%
market share was monopoly); Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797
(1946) (holding that more than two thirds of market established monopoly).
227
Before the introduction of Apple’s iPhone, which combines the feature set of a
smart phone with an iPod, Apple licensed Motorola’s ROKR, a cellular phone that
supported playback of FairPlay-protected iTunes tracks. See Apple.com, Motorola &
Cingular Launch World’s First Mobile Phone with iTunes (Sept. 7, 2005),
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2005/sep/07rokr.html.
228
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411 (“[W]here access exists, the doctrine serves no
purpose.”).
229
See Tim Anderson, How Apple Is Changing DRM, GUARDIAN, May 15, 2008, at 1,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/may/15/drm.apple (reporting
claim that FairPlay has no effect on infringement).
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prices, there is little reason to suspect that device manufacturers are
truly dependent on access to iTunes. Without evidence that access to
a distribution platform or device serves as a competitive necessity or
that access to such a facility is indeed denied, attacks on exclusive
DRM systems premised on the essential facilities doctrine are unlikely
to succeed.
3.

Refusal to Deal

A monopolization claim could also be premised on refusal to deal
grounds. Under this theory, Apple’s consistent refusal to license
Fairplay to competing device manufacturers and download services
constitutes anticompetitive conduct.230 Courts, however, are generally
reluctant to interfere with the long-recognized right to refuse
Forced sharing of
unilaterally to deal with competitors.231
230

Apple’s refusal to license FairPlay and the resulting tight integration of the iPod
and iTunes could serve a number of procompetitive purposes. Apple’s agreements
with the record labels require it to correct any compromise of the FairPlay system
within “a small number of weeks . . . or they can withdraw their entire music catalog
from [the] iTunes store.”
Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music (Feb. 6, 2007),
http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic.
Apple maintains that the
likelihood of breaches and the difficulty of rectifying them would increase if it
disclosed its technology to licensees. As a result, “Apple has concluded that if it
licenses FairPlay to others, it can no longer guarantee to protect the music it licenses
from the big four music companies.” Id.
Another justification for tight integration is a desire to provide a consistent and
seamless end-user experience. Much of the appeal of Apple products stems from their
ease of use and reliability, features Apple believes are dependent on vertical
integration. See LEANDER KAHNEY, INSIDE STEVE’S BRAIN 12 (2008) (“[The] desire to
craft complete customer experiences ensures Apple controls the hardware, the
software, online services, and everything else. But it produces products that work
seamlessly together and infrequently break down.”). Apple’s success, while due in
part to industrial design and marketing, depends on the perception that its products
“just work.” See Julio Ojeda-Zapata, Verizon’s Chocolate Phone Isn’t as Sweet as an
iPod, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 21, 2006, at 1D (“Apple’s hot-selling music players
are popular because they’re so glitch-free and easy to use. They just work.”); Jason
Snell, Inside Apple TV: What We Know and What’s New Since Last Year’s Announcement,
MACWORLD, Mar. 1, 2007 (discussing “‘it just works’ simplicity we’ve come to expect
from Apple”). The refusal to license its Mac OS to other manufacturers reflects in part
Apple’s effort to control the user experience by defining hardware configurations.
Likewise, “had Apple opened its iTunes-iPod juggernaut to outside developers, the
company would have risked turning its uniquely integrated service into a hodgepodge
of independent applications.” Leander Kahney, Evil Genius, WIRED, Apr. 2008, at 138,
available at http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/16-04/bz_apple.
231
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (explaining that
Sherman Act “does not restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent

2009]

Rethinking Anticircumvention’s Interoperability Policy

1605

competitively valuable assets may lessen incentives for investment and
could lead to collusion among competitors.232 Mandatory licensing of
IP rights presents additional difficulties. The power to exclude is the
core of the IP grant, so antitrust enforcement that denies a rights
holder the ability to exclude competitors is in tension with the IP
grant itself.233 As a result, antitrust interferes with enforcement of IP
rights or unilateral refusals to license only under narrowly defined
circumstances.234
Courts have taken two approaches with respect to the refusal to
license IP rights. Both approaches endorse the general principle that
rights holders are free to refuse to license competitors. Some courts
have held that such refusals are legal per se.235 Others have imposed a
rebuttable presumption of legality.236 However, IP rights obtained by
fraud or that are the subject of sham enforcement efforts are the
proper focus of antitrust scrutiny.237 Antitrust scrutiny is likewise
appropriate when rights holders rely on IP grants to “facilitate
monopolization that extends beyond the scope of the intellectual
property right itself.”238
This framework raises two questions when applied to Apple’s
alleged reliance on the DMCA to monopolize the portable player and
digital download markets. First, do the protections the DMCA
extends to copyright holders, TPM developers, and their licensees
establish IP rights that fall within this framework? If so, does Apple’s
refusal to license FairPlay exceed the scope of its statutory rights?

discretion as to parties with whom he will deal”).
232
See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407-08 (“Compelling . . . firms to share the source of
their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law . . . .”).
233
See Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Unilateral Refusals to License in the U.S., in
ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 12, 15-16 (François
Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2005).
234
Courts have held that firms that terminate existing profitable courses of dealing
are subject to antitrust scrutiny. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 603-05 (1985). But no court has yet applied that rationale to a
refusal to license IP rights. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 233, at 34.
235
See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2000); see also Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1293 (N.D. Ala.
2000); Telecomm Tech. Servs. v. Siemens Rolm Commc’ns, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d
1365, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
236
See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218
(9th Cir. 1997); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1186
(1st Cir. 1994).
237
See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176-77 (1965).
238
Hovenkamp et al., supra note 233, at 27.
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The DMCA, which Congress enacted under its commerce authority
rather than its patent and copyright power, does not confer IP rights
in the strictest sense of that term. Nevertheless, it grants powers to
exclude others from the use of technologies and content sufficiently
similar to traditional IP rights to suggest that the typical antitrust
treatment of IP rights should inform analysis of the DMCA.239
The scope of the rights conferred by the DMCA is ambiguous.
Chamberlain and Lexmark suggest that the use of TPMs to restrict
interoperability and reduce competition in ancillary markets may fall
beyond the legitimate scope of those rights. But the holdings in those
cases were not explicitly premised on interference with
interoperability and hinged, in part, on skepticism regarding the
underlying copyright interests at stake.240 Few courts would doubt
that FairPlay protects fully copyrightable expression from a genuine
threat of unauthorized access. In addition, the narrow drafting of §
1201(f) suggests that Congress did not intend to exclude all
interference with interoperable offerings. In the end, interference with
interoperability, standing alone, is unlikely to place DMCA
enforcement efforts beyond the statute’s legitimate scope. Ultimately,
because antitrust is unable to define the legitimate scope of the DMCA
independently, it must defer to the rights Congress created.
C. Deferring to the Scope of IP Rights
Antitrust typically defers to valid exercises of legitimately acquired
IP rights. Without this degree of deference, antitrust would risk direct
conflict with IP doctrine because the rights to exclude that IP provides
with one hand, antitrust could take away with the other. This
deference acknowledges that antitrust law is not well positioned to
second-guess the scope of IP grants established through the legislative
process.241 As one commentator explained, “courts cannot and should
not try to use the antitrust laws to reign [sic] in what may appear to a
239

But see Chamberlain v. Skylink, 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“Congress chose to create new causes of action for circumvention and for trafficking
in circumvention devices. Congress did not choose to create new property rights.”).
240
See id. (noting that Chamberlain did not bring a claim for copyright
infringement); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522,
541 & 548 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing PEP as “purely functional” and rejecting
district court’s determination that Lexmark’s Toner Loading Program was sufficiently
original to support preliminary injunction).
241
See Hovenkamp, supra note 233, at 23-24 (“[A]ntitrust laws were not designed
to repair other government regulatory process, but rather to take these processes as
given and strive to further competition consistent with their mandates.”).
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judge to be excessive congressional grants of economic power through
the intellectual property laws.”242
This deference, however, does not mean that IP rights are altogether
unchecked.
Patent and copyright have developed internal
mechanisms for defining the legitimate scope of the rights they confer.
Aside from generally applicable limitations on the scope and length of
exclusive rights, patent and copyright law rely on their respective
misuse doctrines to limit the extent to which rights holders can
leverage their rights to gain control that exceeds the statutory grant.243
Although the precise relationship between antitrust and misuse has
varied over time, the doctrines are closely related and serve a similar
function — to restrain uses of IP rights that extend beyond the limits
Congress defined.244
The extent to which antitrust can target potentially anticompetitive
exercises of IP rights depends largely on how Congress has crafted,
and the courts have interpreted, those rights. When IP rights are overbroad, the first line of defense should be narrowing the scope of those
rights, not imposing an additional layer of regulation through antitrust
enforcement. Rather than grant an expansive right, await abuse, and
then rely on antitrust to serve as a corrective, IP policy must recognize
its obligation to circumscribe carefully the legitimate bounds of the
rights it confers to avoid harms to competition and innovation.245
Two cases decided by the European Court of Justice demonstrate
the importance of both deference to IP rights and the resulting duty of
IP doctrine to define the limits of its exclusive rights appropriately.
Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission of the European Communities, more
commonly referred to as the Magill case, arose when three Irish
television broadcasters obtained an injunction against Magill’s
publication of a weekly listing of their programming schedules. Irish

242
David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust Law, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 729, 780 (2001).
243
See Burk, supra note 68, at 571. In both the patent and copyright contexts,
misuse is an equitable doctrine that prevents the enforcement of IP rights when a
rights holder attempts to extend the scope of its statutory grant improperly. See
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990).
244
See Mark A. Lemley, A New Balance Between IP and Antitrust, 13 SW. J. L. &
TRADE AM. 237, 255 (2007).
245
See Jonathan Zittrain, The Un-Microsoft Un-Remedy: Law Can Prevent the
Problem That It Can’t Patch Later, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (1999) (arguing with
respect to potential remedies in Microsoft antitrust litigation that “the key may rest in
giving [copyright holders] less of a monopoly to begin with, rather than waiting for
the exploitation of that monopoly to take shape, have effect, and then land a market
leader in court for antitrust violations”).
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copyright law provided the broadcasters exclusive rights in their
program listings, and each published its own weekly programming
guide.246 Because the injunction prevented Magill from competing
with these existing weekly listings, it brought a complaint alleging
violation of European competition law. Confirming two lower
decisions, the European Court of Justice was satisfied that the
broadcasters abused their dominant position in refusing to license
weekly listings to Magill.247
Similarly, IMS Health v. NDC Health addressed a refusal by IMS to
license its “1860 brick structure” — a system for reporting German
pharmaceutical sales data — to its competitor NDC.248 After years of
use and promotion by IMS, the 1860 brick emerged as the industry
standard for packaging data for drug companies, accounting firms, and
insurance providers.249 When NDC’s predecessor adopted the 1860
brick to distribute its own independently generated data, IMS sued for
infringement. After IMS obtained an injunction barring NDC from
using the 1860 brick, NDC attempted to obtain a license to use the
system. IMS refused, prompting NDC to complain that IMS abused its
dominant position. The European Court of Justice, consistent with an
earlier Commission decision requiring IMS to license the 1860 brick
structure, ruled that the case, like Magill, presented “exceptional
circumstances” that justified mandatory licensing of an IP right as a
matter of competition law.250
The European approach to the relationship between IP and
competition law differs in important respects from the deference
typical in the United States. Rather than leaving the determination of
the proper bounds of exclusive rights to the appropriate IP doctrines,
European competition law scrutinizes IP rights directly. In large part,
this approach stems from the fact that competition law is a product of
the European Economic Community Treaty, while individual member
states determine the scope of IP rights.251 Reconciliation of national IP
regimes with the broader goals of “the free movement of goods”
requires occasional subservience of IP rights to competition
principles.252
246

See BBC v. Magill, [1990] I.L.R.M. 534, 541-42 (Ir.).
Case 241/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm’n of the European Cmty., 1995
E.C.R. I-743, ¶ 1.
248
IMS Health v. NDC Health, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 28, at 1549-50.
249
Id. at 1550.
250
Id. at 1578-79, 1582.
251
See Radio Telefis Eireann, E.C.R. 337 at ¶¶ 2-4.
252
See id.
247
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Putting aside the differences between the U.S. and E.U. treatment of
IP and competition law, IMS and Magill teach two lessons. First,
antitrust enforcement can create uncertainty and inefficiency if courts
are free to reconsider existing IP rules. If IP doctrine alone does not
settle the question of the proper scope of IP rights, the threat of
antitrust challenges could result in a lack of clarity that lessens
incentives for innovation and creativity. As these cases demonstrate,
the acquisition and litigation of IP rights are insufficient to adjudicate
an infringement claim when antitrust enforcement enjoys the latitude
to enforce standards inconsistent with IP doctrine.
Perhaps more importantly, Magill and IMS illustrate what happens
when IP grants fail to account adequately for their potential
competitive impact. Although deference ensures greater clarity and
more efficient adjudication, IP doctrine must keep up its end of the
bargain by carefully crafting grants of exclusive rights. There are good
reasons to doubt the wisdom of the copyright claims endorsed in the
disputes that underlie Magill and IMS. Certainly both would be
suspect under U.S. law. The Irish decision permitting exclusive rights
in programming schedules provided exclusive rights in facts, a grant
fundamentally inconsistent with U.S. law.253 Likewise, U.S. law would
protect the 1860 brick structure, if at all, by patent.254 Had the
relevant IP rights not afforded such sweeping protections, neither
Magill nor NDC would have found themselves in the unenviable
position of seeking licenses, let alone pursuing competition claims for
the right to obtain them. Ultimately, Magill and IMS reflect the impact
of a failure to tailor IP rights appropriately.255
Limits on IP rights, however, do more than avoid conflicts with
antitrust law. The primary function of IP protection is to create
incentives for the creation and dissemination of new works. Even in
fully competitive markets, the scope of IP rights can be adjusted to
better serve the instrumental goal of incentivizing new works and the
ultimate end of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts.
If responsibility for determining the outer limits of IP enforcement is
left to antitrust, only behavior that threatens competition will be
prohibited, blunting the ability to fine tune IP policy.
253

See Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
Even if the brick were considered copyrightable subject matter, the external
constraints facing developers of alternate systems would likely limit the scope of any
potential copyright protection.
255
See Kenneth Glazer, The IMS Health Case: A U.S. Perspective, 13. GEO. MASON
L. REV. 1197, 1198 (2006) (“If the [IMS] copyright was questionable, that could (and
should) have been handled by the copyright system directly.”).
254
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Imagine ten competitors that each offer integrated, noninteroperable
systems for the purchase and playback of TPM-restricted digital music
downloads. Rather than a market dominated by the iPod and iTunes,
assume these ten firms controlled roughly equal-sized shares of the
device and download markets. In the absence of some concerted
action, no threat to competition would exist. Nonetheless, the power
to prevent interoperable services still raises important questions for IP
policy. From the patent perspective, would more innovation occur
under a system that offers stronger incentives by limiting
interoperability? Or would greater room for new entrants ultimately
lead to more valuable incremental innovation? From the copyright
and DMCA perspective, would noninteroperability encourage greater
participation by copyright holders in digital marketplaces? Or would
interoperability yield broader dissemination of copyrighted works?
Regardless of the answer to these questions, they should be analyzed
as matters of IP policy, rather than through the narrower lens of
antitrust. As the next Part discusses, legislative change to the DMCA
offers a preferable means of addressing its impact on interoperability.
IV. RECONCILING ANTICIRCUMVENTION & INTEROPERABILITY
The DMCA’s restriction of otherwise permissible uses of
copyrighted works, including efforts to achieve interoperability, has
prompted a variety of proposals.
Dan Burk has argued that
anticircumvention law requires its own doctrine of misuse, drawing on
analogous patent and copyright doctrines, to address efforts to
leverage the rights provided by the DMCA.256 Timothy Armstrong has
suggested that courts should more readily draw on fair use principles
to create a body of judge-made fair circumvention law.257 Jerome
Reichman, Graeme Dinwoodie, and Pamela Samuelson have proposed
a reverse notice and takedown regime under which rights holders
would be obligated to remove TPM restrictions after user notification
of a desire to make lawful uses of TPM-protected works.258 Each of
these proposals has substantial merit and would help address the
many unintended consequences of the DMCA. However, none of
256

Burk, supra note 68, at 571-72.
Timothy K. Armstrong, Fair Circumvention, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 43-48 (2008).
258
Jerome H. Reichman et al., A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable
Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
981, 985 (2007); see also Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle:
Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA’s Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
111, 116 (2005) (proposing administrative mechanism to enable particular fair uses of
works protected by DRM).
257
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these proposals specifically targets the DMCA’s interference with
efforts to create unauthorized interoperable technologies. This Part
offers a proposal that addresses that narrower concern.259
Section 1201(f) reflects Congress’s understanding that
interoperability has value worth preserving. But the narrow text and
consistent misinterpretation of § 1201(f) have greatly diminished its
capacity to safeguard interoperability. Although more reasonable
judicial application of § 1201(f) would increase protections for
interoperability with respect to TPM-restricted computer programs, a
legislative solution is necessary to enable interoperable use of digitally
encoded content.
In addition to the unwarranted distinction between program and
data at the heart of § 1201(f), the DMCA’s impact on interoperability
stems from its protection of noncopyright interests. In its effort to
facilitate greater control over accessing and copying works, the DMCA
reinforces both legitimate copyright holder interests and concerns
entirely divorced from the statutory grant of copyright. To guard
against unauthorized copying, for example, content owners can tie
their works to selected secure platforms. But this same tethering, and
its legal enforcement under the DMCA, can be used to prevent
interoperability for reasons unrelated to concerns over infringement.
Two changes are necessary to preserve the value Congress intended
the DMCA to offer copyright holders while making room for
interoperability. First, the exclusive focus of § 1201(f) on computer
programs must be abandoned in favor of an exemption that applies to
all classes of copyrighted works. Such a change would recognize the
role data plays in enabling system-level interoperability. Second,
legitimate copyright interests must be disaggregated from the control
over distribution and playback technologies that impedes
interoperability.260 The nexus requirement articulated by the Federal

259
Others have offered limited proposals that address the DMCA’s restriction of
interoperability in the durable goods context. See Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of
Unintended Consequences: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 490 (2005) (proposing legislative limitation on application
of DMCA in cases involving replacement parts for durable goods that incorporate
software code). The proposal outlined here, because it addresses the role of data
interoperability, envisions a more comprehensive response.
260
Limiting the ability of TPM providers to sue under the DMCA offers one rough
means of separating legitimate copyright interests from efforts to restrict
interoperability. See 17 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (2006) (providing remedy to “[a]ny person
injured by a violation of section 1201”). As the debate over Real’s Harmony
demonstrated, copyright holders may not object to all alleged circumvention. See
Borland, supra note 182.
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Circuit in Chamberlain reflects this need to separate copyright and
noncopyright interests in applying the anticircumvention provisions.
But there is a risk that future courts will feel more constrained by the
exceedingly detailed statutory framework of the DMCA and thus less
inclined to engage in the common law reasoning that gave rise to the
Chamberlain decision.
The solution offered here provides an
unambiguous statutory basis for drawing such distinctions.
The disaggregation of control over copyrighted works from control
over interoperable technologies addresses the chief difficulty in
expanding § 1201(f). Because the anticircumvention provisions
restrict technologies that interact with TPM-restricted works, a broad
§ 1201(f) could prove the exception that swallows the rule. The
liability provisions of § 1201 could be stripped of practical effect if
measures protecting copyrighted works could be circumvented to
achieve interoperability with any device or program without further
constraints. Suppose a user wants to render a FairPlay-protected
iTunes track interoperable with a program capable of playing only
DRM-free mp3 files. An unqualified right to achieve interoperability
would entitle the user to avoid not only those restrictions that tie the
track to the iPod, but also other substantive limitations on the rights
acquired by the user.261
Such limitations are not necessarily
inconsistent with meaningful interoperability.
To the extent
restrictions intended to effectuate legitimate copyright interests can be
untangled from those meant to enable control over playback and
distribution technologies, interoperability can be reconciled with the
increased control over the copyrighted material that Congress
intended to bolster.
The current § 1201(f) contains some limited assurances against
legitimate copyright holder interests being sacrificed in the name of
interoperability.
The statute, for example, requires potential
But this approach is both over- and under-inclusive. The class of copyright holders
includes device manufacturers, like Lexmark and Chamberlain, keen on limiting
interoperability. And financial ties between copyright holders, device manufacturers,
and TPM providers contribute to a potential overlap of interests. See Jeff Leeds,
Microsoft Strikes Deal for Music, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at C1 (describing
Microsoft’s agreement to pay Universal royalty for each Zune sold). Equally
importantly, there may be good reasons to allow TPM providers redress under the
DMCA. In trafficking cases, evidence of specific acts of circumvention may be
lacking, leaving TPM providers better positioned and more motivated to pursue
§ 1201 claims.
261
Such limitations could include caps on the number of computers authorized to
play a track or the number of times a playlist can be burned to a CD. They could also
extend to restrictions on the period of time during which access is authorized in the
case of subscription or rental services.

2009]

Rethinking Anticircumvention’s Interoperability Policy

1613

circumventors to obtain a copy of a work lawfully, guaranteeing that
only those who purchase, rent, or otherwise furnish some
consideration in exchange for access are entitled to engage in
circumvention.262 However, that requirement alone is insufficient
because it does not secure against unauthorized postsale copying,
distribution, and access enabled in the name of interoperability.
Persistent access controls — TPMs that continue to restrict access
after a user gains initial authorized access — are a controversial
component of the DMCA landscape. The statute’s legislative history
explains that Congress did not intend § 1201 to enable copyright
holders to limit postsale access to lawfully acquired copies of works.263
Scholars have also criticized the role that persistent access controls
play in restricting circumvention that may serve the public interest.264
Nonetheless, copyright holders and TPM providers rely on such
controls to restrict postsale access, and courts have expressed little
hesitation about their enforcement.
Persistent access controls play a crucial role in rental-based models
that rely on the ability to terminate access after a customer has
acquired a fully functional copy of a work. Because users who
download films from online rental services, for example, may be
unwilling simply to delete those files once the rental period has
expired, TPM-based mechanisms for enforcing the terms of such
transactions may be desirable. Persistent access controls are also
useful in fine-tuning access rights. Apple’s FairPlay, for example,
permits users to access protected files on up to five computers, but no
more.265 By helping copyright holders and TPM providers define the
bundle of rights consumers acquire, persistent access controls may
ultimately lead to competition based on the comparative value of
greater or fewer restrictions. Absent judicial or congressional
rejection of persistent access controls, a broadened interoperability
exemption must account for the restrictions they impose.
To disaggregate the legitimate copyright interests reflected in TPMs
from their potential to restrict interoperability for purposes unrelated
to infringement, a revised § 1201(f) should be conditioned on

262

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1) (2006).
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 17-18 (1998) (“Paragraph (a)(1) does not apply
to the subsequent actions of a person once he or she has obtained authorized access to
a copy of a work . . . even if such actions involve circumvention . . . .”).
264
See Reichman et al., supra note 258, at 1008-09; see also JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT 83, 167, 170, 176 (2001) (noting extent to which persistent access controls
restrict access to unprotected facts and ideas).
265
Jobs, supra note 230.
263
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compliance with those restrictions that do not directly implicate
interoperability. Such restrictions include limits on the duration of
access, instances of access, and number of copies a user is entitled to
make. If interoperable developers respect such restrictions, copyright
holders and TPM providers should have no power to tether works to
approved software or hardware.266
Imagine a TPM applied to digital video rentals, which imposes two
distinct restraints. First, it prevents access after the expiration of a
thirty-day rental period. Second, it limits access to approved portable
devices. Suppose an unapproved device manufacturer wants to
interoperate with rentals protected by this TPM. To qualify for
exemption under the revised § 1201(f), the manufacturer must
266

A revised § 1201(f) that implements this approach is included below:
(f) Interoperability.
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), a person who
has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a work may circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to that work for the
sole purpose of identifying and analyzing information necessary to achieve
interoperability with a computer program, if such information has not
previously been readily available to the person engaging in the
circumvention, to the extent any such acts of identification and analysis do
not constitute infringement under this title, and to the extent the
interoperable computer program enforces any restrictions on the duration of
access and the number of instances of access defined by the technological
measure.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a)(1)(A), (a)(2), and (b),
a person may develop and employ technological means to circumvent a
technological measure, or to circumvent protection afforded by a
technological measure, in order to enable the identification and analysis
under paragraph (1), or for the purpose of enabling interoperability of a
work with a computer program, if such means are necessary to achieve such
interoperability, to the extent that doing so does not constitute infringement
under this title, and to the extent the interoperable program enforces any
restrictions on the duration of access, number of permitted instances of
access, or number of permitted copies defined by the technological measure.
(3) The information acquired through the acts permitted under paragraph
(1), and the means permitted under paragraph (2), may be made available to
others solely for the purpose of enabling interoperability of a work with a
computer program, and to the extent that doing so does not constitute
infringement under this title or violate applicable law other than this section.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term “interoperability” means the
ability of a computer program and another work, including another
computer program, to exchange information and use the information that
has been exchanged.
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enforce the thirty-day expiration date. Copyright holders would retain
their power to define the scope of access, but could not dictate the
playback platforms available to end users.
This proposal faces a number of potential objections from both sides
of the interoperability debate. Proponents of increased freedom to
interoperate will likely note that this approach does not maximize
interoperability.
As the major record labels have learned,
interoperability is most prevalent in an environment in which TPMs
are altogether absent. But while the music download market appears
to be converging around a DRM-free standard, other markets are likely
to retain DRM, at least in the short term. Licensed television and
motion picture content, whether purchased or rented, remains subject
to DRM, as does music obtained from most subscription services.267
Where TPMs would continue to restrict access, the revised § 1201(f)
would not give users the freedom to render content interoperable with
any device or software they choose because such freedom would
eliminate the DMCA’s liability provisions altogether. Instead, the
revised interoperability exemption outlined here gives developers the
freedom to design products that interoperate with TPM-restricted
content so long as they respect the material restrictions on access
those TPMs were designed to enforce.
Even if developers have the freedom to interoperate unilaterally
with TPM-protected systems, the possibility of technological
interference by TPM providers could dissuade developers from
investing in interoperable products. As Apple’s reaction to Harmony
demonstrates, TPM providers are well positioned to disrupt unwanted
interoperability. A revised § 1201(f) could respond to this problem in
at least two ways. First, it could do nothing. Allowing rights holders
to interfere technologically with attempts to interoperate would bring
anticircumvention’s interoperability policy back in line with the
treatment of interoperability in IP generally. Although trade secrecy,
copyright, and patent all permit unilateral efforts to interoperate under
appropriate circumstances, none impose obligations on rights holders
to refrain from interfering with competitors’ ability to interoperate.
To the extent that Congress was inclined to promote, rather than
simply tolerate, unilateral interoperability, it could take a second,
267

See Jacqui Cheng, If Music DRM Is Dead, the RIAA Expects its Resurrection, ARS
TECHNICA, May 8, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/05/if-musicdrm-is-dead-the-riaa-expects-its-resurrection.ars;
DefectiveByDesign.org,
Apple
Announces All Music on iTunes to go DRM-Free — No Word on Movies, TV Shows,
Games, Audiobooks and Applications, http://www.defectivebydesign.org/itunes-drmfree (Jan. 8, 2009, 15:11 EST).
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more active approach that provides disincentives against disruptive
strategies.
Congress could withhold the ability to bring a
circumvention or trafficking claim, for example, from copyright
holders or TPM providers that alter the operation of a technological
measure for the primary purpose of interfering with interoperability.
Such a rule might draw on the patent and copyright misuse doctrines,
withholding protection until rights holders take steps to restore
interoperability.268
Any legislative proposal addressing the adverse effects of the DMCA
must also confront the low likelihood of Congress revisiting the
anticircumvention provisions. Several legislative efforts, led by
Representatives Boucher and Lofgren, attempted to lessen the DMCA’s
impact on noninfringing uses of copyrighted works, but failed to
overcome the lobbying efforts of the entertainment industry.269
Although the legislative outlook remains less than promising, there are
reasons to suspect that the proposal offered here could overcome some
of the difficulties facing broader reform efforts. Copyright holders feel
increasingly threatened by the control TPM providers and device
manufacturers like Apple wield over the pricing, distribution, and
playback of digital content.270 Increased interoperability offers one
way to lessen that control without abandoning DRM altogether.
Because the revised § 1201(f) separates the interests of copyright
holders from those of TPM providers, it may increase competition
among download services and playback devices without sacrificing the
benefits of TPMs that copyright holders enjoy.
Nonetheless, copyright holders and TPM providers may object to
expanding § 1201(f) for other reasons. First, they could maintain that
interoperable playback devices and software, even those that faithfully
adhere to limits on access and copying, could harm the long-term
robustness of TPM systems, rendering them more susceptible to

268
Proponents of interoperability would also be justified in noting that loosening
the control the DMCA enables over interoperable technologies does not address all
legal impediments to interoperability. End user license agreements and terms of
service could continue to restrict reverse engineering and the creation of interoperable
products. Likewise, patents will continue to play a role in restricting interoperability.
269
See H.R. 1201, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 107,
108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 5544, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 5522, 107th Cong. (2002);
see also Calandrillo & Davison, supra note 19, at 383-89 (discussing unsuccessful
legislative efforts to reform DMCA).
270
See Jeff Leeds, Free Song Promotion Is Expected from Amazon, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2008, at C1 (describing favorable treatment of Amazon’s download service by record
labels hoping to reduce Apple’s market dominance).
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circumvention. Unlicensed players may prove easier to hack, or may
unintentionally expose decryption keys or other sensitive information.
The loss of control over playback technology could give rise to some
potential threat to TPM robustness. If this risk were sufficient to
undermine the value of TPMs generally, it could be addressed by an
additional restriction on the availability of § 1201(f), one conditioned
on a circumventor’s reasonable steps to ensure the security of the
original TPM or requiring that the resulting interoperable technology
not substantially reduce the security of that TPM. But such conditions
would greatly undermine the value of an expanded § 1201(f). The
potential security risk posed by interoperable technology would prove
a fact-intensive inquiry that would consistently extend potential
litigation beyond summary judgment, imposing substantial costs on
developers of interoperable technologies.
Any comparative analysis of TPM robustness would, of course,
depend on the inherent security of a TPM on sanctioned playback
platforms. As history demonstrates, every widely deployed DRM
system has proven susceptible to circumvention, even when copyright
holders and TPM providers exercised substantial control over
playback technology.271 Indeed, because all DRM systems must
ultimately allow consumers some degree of access to protected
content, they are inherently susceptible to attack.272 Sometimes this
susceptibility is exploited by sophisticated reverse engineers, other
times by enterprising teenagers.273 Even the most sophisticated TPMs,
those termed “unbreakable” by their developers, have fared poorly in
the wild.274
271
See generally Fred von Lohmann, Measuring the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Against the Darknet: Implications for the Regulation of Technological Protection
Measures, 24 LOYOLA L.A. ENT. L. REV. 635 (2004) (arguing that DMCA fails to reduce
digital copyright infringement).
272
See Bruce Schneier, The Futility of Digital Copy Prevention, CRYPTO-GRAM
NEWSLETTER, May 15, 2001, http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0105.html#3
(“This is the Achilles’ heel of all content protection schemes based on encryption: the
display device must contain the decryption key in order to work . . . . The end result
will be failure. All digital copy protection schemes can be broken, and once they are,
the breaks will be distributed . . . law or no law.”).
273
See Alex Eaton-Salners, DVD Copy Control Association v. Bunner: Freedom of
Speech and Trade Secrets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 269, 272 (2004) (describing
involvement of teenager Jon Johansen in creation of DeCSS).
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See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, BluRay’s BD+ DRM Broken, Boing Boing (Mar. 21,
2008), http://www.boingboing.net/2008/03/21/blurays-bd-drm-broke.html (describing
cracking of “unbreakable” BD+ protection scheme used on BluRay discs); Ed Felten,
AACS Plays Whack-a-Mole with Extracted Key (May 1, 2007), http://www.freedom-totinker.com/?p=1152 (describing availability of encryption key used in AACS
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The very enactment of the DMCA serves as recognition of the
technological weakness of the measures that restrict access and
copying of publicly available copyrighted content. Because code alone
is incapable of preventing unauthorized use, legal prohibitions
buttress technological controls. With or without an expanded §
1201(f), TPMs will continue to lack the robustness to restrict
unauthorized use effectively in the absence of legal sanctions. Because
the expanded § 1201(f) retains the legal enforcement mechanism
crucial to the practical value of TPMs, any marginal decrease in their
already low robustness is unlikely to offset the value of increased
interoperability.
But the value of increased interoperability may raise an independent
objection to an expanded § 1201(f). In some circumstances,
interoperability could reduce incentives for certain innovative and
competitive strategies.275 Allowing interoperability without granular
consideration of its effect on such incentives threatens to introduce
uniformity costs.276 An optimal rule, the objection goes, must separate
beneficial interoperability from its harmful counterpart, otherwise any
benefits to incremental innovation and static competition come at a
cost to radical innovation and Schumpeterian competition.
Interoperability could be socially undesirable in two circumstances:
first, if it harms copyright interests by enabling unauthorized access
and copying to a degree that undermines incentives for creation and
distribution; and second, if it harms incentives for competition and
innovation. The first scenario is precisely the concern that motivated
Congress to enact the DMCA. If the distribution platforms and
playback devices used to access digital media cannot make good on
their promise of technological control over user behavior, copyright
owners may simply decline to invest in the creation of such content or
to participate in insecure digital marketplaces. These concerns,
putting aside their likelihood, would be addressed by the revised
§ 1201(f)’s separation of copyright and noncopyright interests. By
requiring interoperable technologies to adhere to restrictions on access
and copying, this statutory change would filter out those interoperable
technologies most likely to harm copyright interests.
protection system employed on BluRay discs).
275
See supra Part I.B.
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See generally Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in
IP Law, 55 AM. U.L. REV. 845 (2006) (explaining that uniform IP rights tend to
provide insufficient protection to those who invest in costly innovations, while
overprotecting those, who because of low innovation costs, require less incentive to
innovate).
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The second scenario contemplates a very different concern, one
Congress never intended the DMCA to address. Without the added
exclusivity provided by § 1201’s restrictions on interoperable
technologies, the worry goes, innovators like Apple will be less inclined
to invest in developing products like the iPod.277 Assuming that
interoperability decreases incentives to a degree sufficient to reduce
innovation — at best, an uncertain assumption — such incentives are
beyond the goals of the DMCA and outside the scope of copyright
policy generally. The DMCA’s interoperability policy cannot balance all
innovative and creative incentives in isolation. Instead, it should be
understood as a more modest tool intended to preserve the existing
incentive structures of copyright law. Moreover, it should be seen as a
single component of IP’s broader interoperability policy. To the extent
limiting interoperability is necessary to preserve incentives for
innovation, those restrictions should be, and are, defined within the
patent system, not the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions. Any
argument that the DMCA is necessary to spur innovation in playback
technologies only reinforces the threat that § 1201 allows a back door to
the more robust protections of patent law, evading its longstanding and
more demanding requirements for exclusivity.
The DMCA currently affords a degree of control over interoperable
technologies incongruous with the treatment of interoperability under
traditional IP regimes. This control extends to any device or service
incorporating a TPM that satisfies the trivial effectiveness requirement
of § 1201. To limit the DMCA’s broad protections, § 1201(f)’s
exemption should be expanded to embrace the circumvention of
TPMs protecting all classes of copyrighted works, not just computer
programs. But the availability of this broadened exemption should be
conditioned on a developer’s adherence to other substantive
restrictions on accessing and copying the underlying work. This
expansion of § 1201(f) would convert the DMCA’s treatment of
interoperability from an aberration to a cohesive component of IP’s
interoperability policy. Developers would regain the freedom to create
interoperable products unilaterally, but copyright holders would
retain the ability to restrict access and copying even within this
interoperable environment.
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The iPod, of course, was developed and released to overwhelming commercial
success years before Apple sold a single DRM-protected song. So the need for the
added exclusivity offered by the DMCA proved unnecessary to spur innovation in at
least one instance.
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CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the DMCA to enable thriving online markets for
copyrighted works by providing rights holders with tools to guard
against unauthorized access and widespread infringement. Despite
Congress’s efforts, the DMCA also gave rise to broad powers over
playback and distribution technologies, which interfere with IP law’s
longstanding tolerance of unauthorized unilateral interoperability.
Ironically, this control over interoperability could hamper the further
development of the very markets Congress intended the DMCA to
foster.
Likewise, restrictions on interoperability conflict with
copyright’s ultimate purpose — the dissemination and use of cultural
works in the progress of science — by preventing authorized
purchasers of copyrighted material from making use of those works.
Antitrust offers, at best, an imperfect means of redressing the
DMCA’s impact on interoperability. Not all interference with
interoperability gives rise to cognizable competitive harms. In
addition, the deference antitrust shows towards legitimately acquired
IP rights requires rights holders to exceed the scope of their statutory
grants before facing antitrust liability.
As a result, internal clarification and adjustment of the DCMA’s
scope offer the best hope for reestablishing the legitimacy of
unauthorized interoperability. This approach recognizes the need for
IP doctrine to tailor carefully the protections it offers and to take
responsibility for their unintended consequences. The expansion of
the § 1201(f) interoperability exemption outlined here addresses
anticircumvention’s impact on interoperability, but does so without
ignoring the concerns over unauthorized access and copying that
motivated the DMCA.
Ultimately, as copyright holders, content distributors, and device
manufacturers have begun to realize, and as consumers have long
understood, complete freedom to interoperate depends on the absence
of technological restrictions on copyrighted works. The use of TPMs,
however, will undoubtedly continue in some markets. Their legal
reinforcement, however, can and should accommodate the freedom to
interoperate.

